Reviving a Natural Right: The Freedom of Autonomy Amendment
Michael Anthony Lawrence1
Something is wrong in twenty-first century America when it comes to recognizing
certain “self-evident truths” of freedom identified in its founding document nearly 23
decades ago. In particular, the United States today fails to uphold the core principle of
the Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal: that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights: that among these are life,
liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” This description was more than just an
accidental well-turned phrase – as demonstrated by the historical record, it
represented the very foundation of the Revolutionary political theory, and was intended
to draw strict boundaries for the proper reach of government. America of the early
twenty-first century is a place where oppressive state constitutional amendments
discriminate against same-sex couples; where compassionate end-of-life choice is
illegal in 49 states and where the one state where it is legal is being sued by the U.S.
government; where tens of thousands are in prison for possessing or using marijuana;
where a woman’s right to maintain control over her own reproductive decisions hangs
by a thread; and where religious freedom is under relentless attack. How is it that
Tocqueville’s prediction of a “wholly new species of oppression…, [where] the
democratic government, acting in response to the will of the majority, … create[s] a
society with a network of … [rules] that none can escape” has indeed come to pass?
This essay explores progressively the nature of the right of “freedom of autonomy,”
several present-day applications and the right’s historical foundations, then asserts
that nothing short of a constitutional amendment prohibiting federal and state
government from abridging any person’s individual freedom of autonomy on matters of
natural private concern will suffice in protecting the right as it was envisioned at the
time of America’s founding and reaffirmed in the Reconstruction. Now is the time for
change.

I. INTRODUCTION
Something is wrong in twenty-first century America when it comes to recognizing certain “selfevident truths”2 of freedom identified in its founding document nearly 23 decades ago. In
particular, the United States today fails to uphold the core principle of the Declaration of
Independence that “all men are created equal: that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
inalienable rights: that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”3 This
description was more than just an accidental well-turned phrase – as demonstrated by the
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Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law.
“We hold these truths to be self-evident….” Declaration of Independence.
3
Declaration of Independence. Historian Leonard Levy writes, “The pursuit of happiness, a phrase used
by Locke for a concept that underlay his political ethics, subsumed the great rights of liberty and property,
which were inextricably related. Lockean thought, to which the Framers subscribed, included within the
pursuit of happiness that which delighted and contented the mind and a belief that indispensable to it were
good health, reputation, and knowledge. There was nothing radical in the idea of the right to the pursuit of
happiness. [Even t]he anti-American Tory Dr. Samuel Johnson had used the phrase, and Sir William
Blackstone, also a Tory, employed a close equivalent in his Commentaries in 1765 when remarking ‘that
man should pursue his own happiness. This is the foundation of what we call ethics, or natural law.”
Leonard Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights 251 (2001 Yale Nota Bene ed.).
2
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historical record, it represented the very foundation of the Revolutionary political theory,4 and
was intended to draw strict boundaries for the proper reach of government. The radical nature of
this statement lies in the fact that no political regime had ever before so clearly and openly placed
individual liberties beyond the reach of government.
We’ve come a long way in America since the founding, but in the modern era we’ve come in
precisely the wrong direction in honoring the sort of rich individual liberties of equality and of
free choice on matters of natural private concern (call it collectively “freedom of autonomy”)5
demanded in the Declaration of Independence, and memorialized in the Constitution.6 Although
progress has been made to correct some government practices fundamentally inconsistent with
the Declaration’s exhortations7 - slavery was abolished; blacks, women and non-propertied men
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“According to American revolutionary theory, … natural rights … were possessed by individuals in the
state of nature, which existed before people voluntarily contracted with each other to establish a
government whose purpose was to secure their rights. In the state of nature, when only the law of nature
governed, the theory posited that – as the first section of the Virginia Declaration of Rights stated – ‘all
men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter
into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment
of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety.’” Levy, supra note 3 at 15-16. “Madison, presenting his proposed [Bill of Rights],
spoke of ‘the perfect equality of mankind.’” Id. at 254-55.
5
In substance the term “freedom of autonomy” encompasses, but is not completed by, the Supreme Court’s
fourteenth amendment privacy and equal protection doctrines. The term “freedom of autonomy” is used to
allow a fresh look at, and revival of, the thinking that existed from the pre-Revolutionary and founding eras
through the nation’s early decades of a comprehensive, broad-based individual freedom in which
government is strictly subordinate to the individual and acts legitimately only insofar as it protects
individual liberty and equality on matters of natural private concern; and to urge a repudiation of the
current conventional thinking in which government predominates at the expense of the individual and
parses out recognition of privacy rights like so many sugar cubes to a cooperative pony.
6
“In the minds of the Framers, many provisions of the Constitution had a libertarian character [of limiting
government to promote individual liberty]…. During the controversy over ratification of the Constitution,
when the omission of a bill of rights was the major issue, many Framers argued, as did Alexander Hamilton
in The Federalist, No. 84, ‘that the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful
purpose, a Bill of Rights.’… The overwhelming majority of the Convention believed … that a bill of rights
‘is unnecessary.’” Levy, supra note 3 at 17-19. In creating a new national government with strictly
enumerated limited powers, the Framers could not conceive of the government infringing on rights.
“While a new national power system emerged from [the Constitutional ratification] struggle, it does not
mark a sudden break in the ideological history of our national origins. [Rather, t]he essential spirit of
eighteenth-century reform – its idealism, its determination to free the individual from the power of the
state, even a reformed state – lived on, and lives on still.” BAILYN, BERNARD, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS
OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION viii (Enl. Ed. 1992 (1967 (winner of Bancroft and Pulitzer Prizes))).
Similarly, “[t]o argue that the Framers had used natural rights as a means of escaping obligations of
obedience to the king [Declaration] but did not use natural rights ‘as a source for rules of decision’
[Constitution] is hogwash. One has only to read the state recommendations for a bill of rights to know that
the natural rights philosophy seized the minds of the Framers as it had the minds of the rebellious patriots
of 1776. One can also read natural rights opinions by members of the early Supreme Court to arrive at the
same conclusion….” Levy, supra note 3 at 255-56. (Point of definition: It is useful to distinguish the
“founders” of the Declaration of Independence from the “framers” of the Constitution - only eight of the 55
signers of the Declaration were among the 39 signers of the Constitution. Robert A. Dahl, How
Democratic is the American Constitution 4-5 (2d ed. 2003 [2002])).
7
Even in the beginning the statement that “all men are created equal” was hypocritical in the extreme, in
light of the facts that in 1776 slavery was legal – and would continue to be legal for many more decades;
that many adults, including women - fully half of the adult population - could not vote; and that Native
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got the vote; and some (but only some) of the inequities experienced by Native Americans have
been addressed - the unfortunate fact remains in the early twenty-first century that America, the
“Land of the Free” immortalized in story and song, is assuredly no longer – if it ever was - “the
freest nation on Earth,” notwithstanding politicians’ and others’ routine proclamations to the
contrary.8
One need look no further than the election of 2004, when state constitutional amendments
dramatically restricting the liberties of millions of Americans were passed in all thirteen states
where they were on the ballot9 - blatant discrimination disguised under the good name of
democracy - to get an idea how widespread is the larceny. America is losing ground - is
backtracking - on matters of freedom of autonomy. Today, more than ever, majorities are
allowed to steal from minorities what are inherent natural rights of individual autonomy, and to
impose upon others their own chosen brands of morality and sets of values.10
Americans had only begun to be systematically deprived and cheated of their rights. As stated by the
political historian Robert A. Dahl,
The authors of the familiar words about equality … and the fifty-five delegates of the Second
Continental Congress who voted to adopt the Declaration in July 1776, were, of course, all men,
none of whom had the slightest intention of extending the suffrage or many other basic political
and civil rights to women – who by the laws of that time and for a full century after were the legal
property of their fathers or husbands. Nor did the worthy supporters of the Declaration mean to
include slaves or, for that matter, free persons of African origin, who were a substantial fraction of
the population in almost all the colonies…. The principal author of the Declaration, Thomas
Jefferson, owned several hundred slaves none of whom he freed during his life…. Nor did our
noble Declaration mean to include the people who for thousands of years had inhabited the lands
that Europeans colonized and came to occupy….”
Dahl, supra note 6 at 124-25. So much for self-evident truths.
8
Other governments such as The Netherlands, Belgium, and Canada, to name just a few, have surpassed
the United States in their tolerance of individual freedom of autonomy. Those who cling to the myth of
America as the preeminent keeper of the flame of freedom point mainly to two aspects of the U.S.
Constitution: one, the requirement of democratic elections to select representatives to the legislative and
executive branches of federal and state government; and two, the Bill of Rights’ and fourteenth
amendment’s guarantees that certain individual freedoms are beyond the government’s reach.
As for the first, free democratic elections do not a free nation make. Elections are a crucial element of free
societies, to be sure, but it does not follow as a matter of course that free democratic elections create free
societies – in fact, representatives democratically elected by majorities are all-too-capable of systematically
oppressing a vast assortment of minority freedoms, and they do so all the time right here in America.
On the second, there’s no question the Bill of Rights and fourteenth amendment have been instrumental in
protecting individual liberties. The problem is that the guarantees are unevenly applied, in large part
because the provisions are not explicit in the liberties that they are meant to protect. This ambiguity was
largely by design, of course, to allow future generations some degree of interpretive flexibility to respond
to changing times, see, generally, e.g., Levy, supra note 3; Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights (Yale 1998), but
its downside is that the judiciary may sometimes adopt more restrictive interpretations of individual rights
than it should in a nation whose founders held as one of their highest values the preservation of individual
liberty.
9
The amendments were ostensibly to ban same-sex marriage, but in fact their intent and scope are far
broader than that in curbing the rights of gay Americans. In Michigan, to offer just one example (this is
happening others of the thirteen states as well), the state’s Attorney General recently issued an opinion that
state actors could no longer extend benefits to same-sex couples.
10
The sort of moral watch-dogging engaged in by these majorities reminds one of an old Dr. Seuss rhyme:
Out west, near Hawtch-Hawtch, there’s a Hawtch-Hawtcher Bee-Watcher. His job is to watch…
Is to keep both his eyes on the lazy town bee. A bee that is watched will work harder, you see.
Well… he watched and he watched. But, in spite of his watch, that bee didn’t work any harder.
Not mawtch. So then somebody said, “our old bee-watching man just isn’t bee-watching as hard
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Moreover, even in the areas where America historically has led the way for other nations –
protecting religious plurality, for example, as practiced in the pre-Revolutionary colonies11 and
guaranteed by the Establishment Clause requirement that the government shall not favor one
religion over another (or, for that matter, religion in general over non-religion) and the free
exercise clause – Americans’ basic freedoms are suffering a slow but steady “death by a thousand
cuts.”12
Who can remember the last time Congress took a principled though unpopular stand for
individual freedom of autonomy? In the United States Congress of the twenty-first century, the
Senate votes 99-0 to condemn a U.S. Court of Appeals decision protecting an atheist’s right to
have his daughter educated free of government coercion to pledge allegiance to one Nation
“under God,”13 and both houses pass legislation (eagerly signed by the president) attempting
through procedural maneuvering to prevent a woman in a persistent vegetative state from
exercising her right to be free of unwanted medical treatment and remove feeding tubes, even
though state courts had determined repeatedly by the evidentiary standard required by state law
(clear and convincing evidence), that she would wish not to be maintained in that condition.14
as he can. He ought to be watched by another Hawtch-Hawtcher! The thing that we need is a
Bee-Watcher-Watcher!” WELL…
The Bee-Watcher-Watcher watched the Bee-Watcher. He didn’t watch well. So another HawtchHawtcher had to come in as a Watch-Watcher-Watcher! And today all the Hawtchers who live in
Hawtch-Hawtch are watching on Watch-Watcher-Watchering-Watch, Watch-Watching the
Watcher who’s watching that bee. You’re not a Hawtch-Watcher. You’re lucky, you see!”
Dr. Seuss, Did I Ever Tell You How Lucky You Are? (196_).
11
Levy, supra note 3, at 6 (writing that “Maryland’s Toleration Act of 1649 was far more liberal than
England’s Toleration Act forty years later,… [and] was the first to use the phrase ‘the free exercise of
religion,’ later embodied in the First Amendment. The act also symbolized the extraordinary fact that for
most of the seventeenth century in Maryland, Catholics and Protestants openly worshiped as they chose and
lived in peace, if not amity…. [T]he Charter of Rhode Island … made the guarantee of religious liberty a
part of the fundamental law. It secured for all inhabitants ‘the free exercise and enjoyment of their civil
and religious rights.” At the time of the founding, “nowhere did freedom of religion prosper as it did in
America.” Levy, supra at 3.
12
See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
13
See Michael Anthony Lawrence, Court Misses Chance in Pledge Case, The Detroit News, May _, 2004.
14
See Moving Quickly, Congress Passes Schiavo Measure, NY Times, March 21, 2004. See Lawrence,
Michael Anthony, “Actions Show Congress’ Total Disregard for a Citizen’s “Right to be Left Alone,”
Detroit Free Press, March 22, 2005. Congress’s action in this case was inappropriate on multiple levels.
Indeed, the current House majority leader Tom DeLay, a little man prone to bullying and corruption, see,
e.g., __ Wall St. J. __, epitomizes the constitutionally clueless attitude held by the United States Congress
in his comment responding to the federal courts’ declining to take up Congress’s cause in this case:
“[These judges] thumbed their nose at Congress and the president.… [T]he time will come for the men
responsible for this to answer for their behavior, but not today.” Editorial, Judges under Attack,
International Herald-Tribune, April 6, 2005. As noted by the editors, “Coming so close to the fatal
shooting of one judge in his courtroom and the killing of two family members of another, those words were
at best an appalling example of irresponsibility in pursuit of political gain. But they wer not an angry, offthe-cuff reaction…. Republicans in Congress and the Bush administration, unhappy with some of the
rulings of the judiciary, are trying to write it out of its constitutional role…. [I]f Congress succeeds in
curtailing the judiciary’s ability to act as a check on the other two branches, the United States will be far
less free.” Id.
Listen to this 1730 description of Parliament and the prime minister as “chief ruler” by a leading opposition
writer, Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, (whose writings influenced the Revolutionary generation,
see infra notes 144, 148), and query if it doesn’t sound disconcertingly like the U.S. Congress of the twenty
first century: “The chief ruler [majority leader], is nominally a minister only … but in reality he is a
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The sort of positions being taken by Congress and the president in these and other cases15 would
have been unthinkable through much of the nation’s history. The most basic concept among the
founding generations for what this new nation “America” was to stand for was the lofty principle
that government of any sort16 simply lacks the authority – legal, moral, or otherwise - to interfere
with individual liberty on matters of natural private concern. This principle was important
enough over which to fight a war of independence, and is memorialized in word and spirit in the
Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. It was a major theme of the Reconstruction
which brought wayward states into the fold of personal liberty. The preeminence of the concept
was recognized by Justice Louis Brandeis when he stated famously in 1928, “The makers of our
Constitution … conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone - the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”17
Given the bleak present picture, what does the future hold for the cause of freedom of autonomy
in America? Do the results of the 2004 election, as only the most recent example of the atrocities
being committed against the cause of individual freedom, suggest that it is too late? Is America
incorrigible when it comes to making a real commitment to freedom of autonomy – that is, to
respecting the right of other people to do what they will even if it horrifies or repulses us?18
sovereign, as despotic, arbitrary a sovereign as this part of the world affords …. [He] hath unjustly
engrossed the whole power of a nation into his own hands … [and] admits no person to any considerable
post of trust and power under him who is not either a relation, a creature, or a thorough-paced tool whom
he can lead at pleasure into any dirty work without being able to discover his designs or the consequences
of them…. Some deputies [Representatives] are tied down with honors, titles, and preferments, of which
the [chief ruler][majority leader] engrosses the disposal to himself, and others with bribes which are called
pensions in these countries. Some are persuaded to prostitute themselves for the lean reward of hopes and
promises; and others, more senseless than all of them, have sacrificed their principles and consciences to a
set of party names, without any meaning, or the vanity of appearing in favor at court [before the
president].’ Bailyn, supra note 6, at 50 (quoting The Craftsman, nos. 172, October 18, 1729; and 198 April
18, 1730 (in the London, 1731 ed. V, 152-153, 155, 156; VI 138 ff.).
15
The PATRIOT Act of 2001 itself is worthy of volumes of discussion on its abridgement of civil liberties
and, for our purposes, freedom of autonomy.
16
“The dominant theory in the United States from the time of the Revolution was that the fundamental law
limited all branches of the government, not just the crown as in England, where the great liberty documents
did not limit the legislative power.” Levy, supra note 3 at 24.
17
Olmstead v. U.S. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The quote, in full, states:
The protection guaranteed by the amendments is much broader in scope. The makers of our
Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized
the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a
part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect, that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by
the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation….
Id. As a reminder to Congress, the President, and all other federal, state and local government officials of
the axiom that government acts legitimately only insofar as it protects the individual’s “right to be let
alone,” Justice Brandeis’ “right to be let alone” opinion should be framed and placed in every federal and
state building in the land - perhaps in place of the Ten Commandments.
18
Is there an alternative to a world where groups of individuals and governments “proclaim, in a variety of
accents: “We are the Chosen Ones, let the rest of humanity go to hell”? Bruce Ackerman, The Future of
Liberal Revolution 23 (Yale 1992)[hereinafter Liberal Revolution]. Yes. On toleration, we can benefit by
looking at things from a deontological point of view. Individuals and government alike (government is,
after all, composed of individual people) presumably would be more tolerant in their behaviors and policies
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From an institutional sense certainly it is not too late – America has the governmental structure,
with the Constitution, to effect major change. And certainly America has the legacy of freedom –
the stalwart individuals who peopled the continent from pre-Revolutionary days through the early
decades of the new nation had it within themselves to stand firmly on principles of liberty.
Whether Americans in the twenty-first century have the will to fight the good fight is a much
more uncertain question. A good many Americans have proven themselves to be remarkably
intolerant on matters involving individual freedom of autonomy - and the necessary changes are
going to require a lot of goodwill and tolerance on the part of many millions of people.
Truth be told, America’s current struggles are not entirely unanticipated. Alexis de Tocqueville,
while predicting the inevitability of democracy’s appeal worldwide in stating, “The gradual
development of the equality of conditions is … a providential fact, and it possesses all the
characteristics of a Divine decree: it is universal, it is durable, it constantly eludes all human
interference, and all events as well as men contribute to its progress,”19 wasn’t so sanguine about
the long -term effects of democratic political equality on individuals: “[A] wholly new species of
oppression will arise. Among citizens equal and alike, the supreme power, the democratic
government, acting in response to the will of the majority, will create a society with a network of
small complicated rules, minute and uniform, that none can escape. [Sound familiar?]
Ultimately, then, the citizens of a democratic of a democratic country will be reduced to nothing
better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd.”20
if operating under a semblance of the Rawlsian “veil of ignorance,” where we imagine ourselves ignorant
of particular facts “such as [our] race, gender, intelligence, disabilities or lack of them, [our] particular life
plan and proclivities, and all other particular facts about [our] aspirations and circumstances. In this
original position [we] would be permitted to have knowledge only of ‘general facts’ about [our] societies,
such as that a condition of moderate scarcity obtains, and widely accepted laws of psychology and
economics…. It is like being asked to agree on the rules for playing a game before you know whether they
will work to your advantage, or a congressman being bound in advance by the findings of a military baseclosing commission before knowing whether the commission will recommend closing the base in his
district….” . . IAN SHAPIRO, THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF POLITICS 116 (2003) (citing John Rawls, A
Theory of Justice 113 (2d ed Harvard 1999)). The idea is rather like the old kindergarten maxim to ‘treat
others as you would like to be treated yourself.”
In a similar vein, Bruce Ackerman asks us to consider a flesh and blood “stranger”: “Strangers may live
next door, but they are not like us. They are doing odd things at odd times for reasons that disturb us in
basic ways. How to respond to this unease? By loving the strangers as ourselves? Only a god could do
this: there are too many strangers with too many strangenesses. Or should we persuade the strangers to
change their actions and beliefs so they agree with ours? I would never give up on this project. But
persuasion and reflection take time; I must listen to the strangers’ arguments if I expect them to listen to
mine. In the meantime, an abyss lies between us, and we may die before one of us comes to see the other’s
truth for what it is. How then are we to conduct our ongoing life together? … You and I may remain
strangers, but we may find common ground in a politics that protects our equal right to cultivate our
distinctive characters without any one stranger calling the shots…. [If we do this,] we may be something
more than strangers, if less than friends…. However odd or perverse our beliefs may seem to one another,
perhaps we can find common ground in recognizing this: you and I are both struggling to find meaning in
the world.” Ackerman, supra at 22.
19
Dahl, supra note 6, at 126 (quoting Tocqueville, Alexis, Democracy in America vol. 1, p. lxxxi (New
York: Schocken Books 1961, Henry Reeve, trans.)).
20
Id. at 133 (closely paraphrasing Tocqueville, supra note 19, at 1: 298, 304, and 2: 380-81.). Before
Tocqueville, Benjamin Franklin had similar concerns, commenting upon the finished Constitution to the
Constitutional Convention (to which he was not a delegate, serving during that time in France) in 1787, “I
agree to this Constitution with all its faults, if they are such: because I think a General Government
necessary for us, and there is no Form of Government but what may be a Blessing to the People if welladministered; and I believe farther that this is likely to well administered for a Course of Years and can
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Tocqueville’s prediction provokes a spirited rebuttal from modern defenders of democracy like
Ronald Dahl, who states, “if we read the passages as a forecast of the way in which democratic
countries would tend to evolve, I think we are bound to conclude that Tocqueville was just dead
wrong. When we examine the course of democratic development over the past two centuries, and
particularly over the century just ended, what we find is a pattern of democratic development that
stands in total contradiction to such a prediction. We find instead that as democratic institutions
become more deeply rooted in a country, so do fundamental political rights, liberties, and
opportunities. As a democratic government matures in a country, the likelihood that it will give
way to an authoritarian regime approaches zero.”21
To the extent Tocqueville’s passage is read as predicting that democracy leads inevitably to
authoritarian government, Dahl undoubtedly is correct – history has shown, at least to date, that
mature democratic regimes do not give rise to authoritarianism. Indeed, democracy is the best
political alternative so far devised for protecting individual liberty22 – post-Enlightenment23 or
only end in Despotism as other Forms have done before it, when the People shall become so corrupted as to
need Despotic Government, being incapable of any other.” Gore Vidal, Inventing a Nation: Washington,
Adams, Jefferson 31 (2003). Gore Vidal, the popular author and commentator on American life, offers the
following observation: “Now, two centuries and sixteen years later, Franklin’s blunt dark prophecy has
come true: popular corruption has indeed given birth to that Despotic Government which he foresaw as
inevitable at our birth. Unsurprisingly, a third edition of [an] admirable [biography of Franklin] is now on
sale … with, significantly – inevitably?, Franklin’s somber prediction cut out thus silencing our only great
ancestral voice to predict Enron et seq., not to mention November 2000, and, following that, despotism
whose traditional activity, war, now hedges us all around. No wonder that so many academic histories of
our republic and its origins tend to gaze fixedly upon the sunny aspects of a history growing ever darker.
No wonder they choose to disregard the wise, eerily prescient voice of the authentic Franklin in favor of the
jolly fat ventriloquist of common lore…. It would appear that even to this day Franklin has been censored.
In the best of America’s high school history books, The American Pageant, … there is a curious passage
about Franklin vis-à-vis the Constitutional Convention: Franklin ‘was inclined to be indiscreetly talkative
in his declining years. Concerned for the secrecy of their deliberations, the convention assigned chaperones
to accompany Franklin to dinner parties and make sure he held his tongue.’ Thus were we deprived of the
wisdom of the only worldly – not to mention perhaps the wisest – of the founders. But then much in our
intellectual political life has always been ritually suppressed for secrecy’s sake.” Vidal, supra, at 30-31,
32-33.
21
Dahl, supra note 6 at 134. Dahl adds, “Democracy can, as we all know, collapse into dictatorship. But
breakdowns are extraordinarily rare in mature democracies…. Even mature democratic countries have had
to face wars, economic depression, large-scale unemployment, terrorism, and other challenges. But they
did not collapse into authoritarian regimes. In the twentieth century, on something like seventy occasions
democracies have given way to nondemocratic regimes. Yet with very few exceptions, these breakdowns
have occurred in countries where democratic institutions were very new – less than a generation old.” Id.
22
“The historical record reveals that democracies are better respecters of individual rights and civil liberties
than nondemocracies.” Shapiro, supra note 18, at 226. Moreover, “the democratic tradition also does
comparatively well when considered alongside” other post-Enlightenment intellectual political traditions
like classical utilitarianism, social contract theory, Marxism, and anti-Enlightenment theory. Specifically,
[c]lassical utilitarianism … [is] indifferent to individual rights, rendering it vulnerable to Rawls’s
critique that it fails to take seriously the differences among persons. Neoclassical utilitarianism
avoids this charge, but at the price of taking on new difficulties with respect to individual rights.
In some formulations it operates with so robust a libertarian conception of individual autonomy
that it violates the rights of others once unintended harms and the broader context of resources is
taken into account…. The Marxist tradition oscillates between an implausible utopian ideal,
according to which the need for rights would be rendered obsolete with the abolition of injustice,
and a strong version of Locke’s workmanship ideal. This is incoherently cashed out as the theory
of exploitation and it is in any case vulnerable to Rawls’s argument about moral arbitrariness….
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otherwise. But given its more natural reading, the passage describes not so much the
transformation of government into an authoritarian regime as it does the subtle changes likely to
occur after decades and centuries of “majority tyranny”24 in a democracy. What is the nature of
this change? Answer: entrenched bureaucracy, government sclerosis created by generations of
majorities seeking to solidify and perpetuate their legacy by institutionalizing their policies
Nor is there an account of who will decide how, and to what extent, minimizing exploitation
should be traded off against other goods such as efficiency, or of who will hold decision-makers
accountable for their decisions about these matters…. Certainly the record of nondemocratic
socialist and communist states that have existed in the world is scarcely encouraging [on the
matter of protecting individual rights]…. [For its part, [t]he anti-Enlightenment move is
profoundly unsatisfactory with respect to individual rights. Burke’s argument is a caution against
making things worse by trying to make them better, and he reasonably reminds us that changing
our political institutions has an inescapable dimension of rebuilding a ship at sea. Well taken as
his admonitions against vanguardism undoubtably are, ships sometimes rot and decay, and they
can sometimes be improved upon. That a system of institutions has endured may create a
presumption in favor of its legitimacy, but it is a rebuttable one…. [V]arious postmodern and
communitarian schools of thought … may often leave objectionable practices unscathed…. In
contrast, the democratic approach creates an impetus to reform inherited practices as they are
reproduced into the future: Minimizing the domination they can foster by pressing for decisionmaking in accordance with the principle of affected interest and opening up avenues for
meaningful opposition. When it operates well, democratization leads to a world in which
collective practices achieve, and deserve, increasing legitimacy. Last, but by no means least
important, the democratic tradition offers fruitful resources to manage the potential tensions
between the Enlightenment commitments to the pursuit of truth through science and the centrality
of individual rights [e.g., ‘if there are unassailable right answers about political legitimacy that any
clearheaded person must affirm, in what sense do people really have the right to decide this for
themselves? But if they are free to reject what science reveals on the basis of their own
convictions, then what is left of science’s claim to priority over other modes of engaging with the
world?’ Id. at 17]… Both values are better served by the structured instability of power relations
that proponents of democracy seek to institutionalize. Democracy is a system in which those who
are disadvantaged by present arrangements have both the incentive and the resources to point to
the defects of those arrangements, show how the truth about them is being obscured, and try to get
those arrangements changed. In a world in which those contending for power must appeal to the
human interest in knowing and acting on the truth, there will always be those who try to twist the
truth to their purposes, thereby taking advantage of others. Democratic competition for power …
is the best available response to this state of affairs. It is, however, better thought of as essential
medicine for a chronic malady than as a cure that will ever render the treatment redundant.”
Shapiro, supra note 18, at 227-30.
23
The Enlightenment’s attention to individual rights “differentiates its political philosophy from the
ancient and medieval commitments to order and hierarchy. This focus brings the freedom of the individual
to the center of arguments about politics. This move was signaled in the natural law tradition by a shift in
emphasis from the logic of law to the idea of natural right. SHAPIRO, supra note 18, at 14. Along with its
commitment to individual rights, the Enlightenment is characterized by a preoccupation with science. Id.
at 224 (noting that the concerns of science and individual rights “enjoy a lineage that predates the
Enlightenment. Plato’s discussion of democracy reminds us that political philosophers had been concerned
both with potential tensions between democracy and the truth for over two millennia and with the
possibility that, in a democracy, respect for individual freedom might be threatened by mob tyranny.”…
There is nothing entirely new under the modern sun.”).
24
James Madison was keenly aware of the threat that majorities pose to individual liberties. In his speech
before Congress on June 8, 1789, he stated that “[t]he great objective he had in mind for the Bill of Rights
… was to limit the powers of government, thus preventing legislative as well as executive abuse, and above
all preventing abuses of power by ‘the body of the people, operating by the majority against the minority.’
Mere ‘paper barriers’ might fail, but they raised a standard that might educate the majority against acts to
which they might be inclined.” Levy, supra note 3, at 35.
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through picayune rules and regulations that reach into virtually every corner of life - rules and
regulations which by their very nature cannot help but infringe on individual liberties including,
for purposes of this essay, the individual freedom of autonomy.
And so it is today. Tocqueville’s blunt, remarkably prescient prediction for the mature
democracy is an all-too-accurate description of life in twenty-first century America. While it
doesn’t contribute to a positive self image to consider oneself as part of a flock of timid animals
(even if industrious) beholden to its government shepherd, the description rings uncomfortably
true. On a more optimistic note, perhaps some among the flock, if given a ray of hope, would
enthusiastically agree that the shepherd needs to be re-directed.
Look again to the inspirational words of the Declaration of Independence, not just as lofty and
unattainable rhetoric, but as a realistic – though highly elusive - goal. From the beginning, our
forebears knew it would not be easy. When freedom was on the line, “the colonists knew …
[w]hat would in fact happen in England and America would be the result … of the degree of
vigilance and the strength of purpose the people could exert. For they believed … [t]he
preservation of liberty would continue to be what it had been in the past, a bitter struggle with
adversity….”25
The preservation of liberty continues to be yet today what it has been in the past - a bitter struggle
with adversity. Only time will tell how the next stage in freedom’s evolution (or revolution)
plays out in America – and whether modern-day Americans have the guts to make the necessary
changes to ensure liberty, or instead demonstrate themselves to be mere sheep unworthy of their
ancestors’ stalwart legacy.
.

.

.

As a preliminary matter, the arguments advanced in this essay might be described, depending on
the taxonomy adopted,26 at various points as “rights foundationalist,”27 “liberal,”28 “liberal
republican,”29 “Lockean,”30 “Jeffersonian,”31 “constititutionalist,”32 “civil libertarian,”33 “social

25

Bailyn, supra note 3 at 85.
Labels, as academics know, can be useful in organizing taxonomies, although they can also be limiting.
We’ve become so committed to roles and labels – and so polarized - in America that we think the roles and
labels define us. In the end, it’s not the labels that matter – it’s the substance behind the labels that counts.
27
See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-16 (Belknap: Harvard 1991) [hereinafter
Foundations] (contrasting “monist” arguments (favoring democratic processes over rights theory) with
“foundationalist” arguments (those favoring rights theory over democratic processes), and proposing a
middle (“dualist”) ground).
28
See infra notes 63, 67-70 and accompanying text.
29
The arguments line up, at least partially, with Ackerman’s description, writing, “[t]his kind of
liberalism[, liberal republicanism,] does not look upon people as abstract individuals, divorced from their
social contexts, nor does it embrace the notion of “natural rights” to property and contract…. It insists that
the foundation of personal liberty is a certain kind of political life – one requiring the ongoing exertions of
a special kind of citizenry. Rather than grounding personal freedom on some putatively prepolitical ‘state
of nature,’ this kind of liberalism makes the cultivation of liberal citizenship central to its enterprise.”
Ackerman, Foundations, supra note 27, at 30. Agreed – except there are some rights that are special, that
are grounded in a “prepolitical ‘state of nature’: “privacy” rights, for example, some (but not all) of the
rights embraced within the Bill of Rights, such as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and right to be
free of cruel and unusual punishment assuredly are not subject to “ongoing exertions … of citizenry.”
They are absolute natural rights, beyond any actions of the citizenry – nothing the citizenry does or says
should be able to alter them. Freedom of autonomy is likewise this sort of absolute, natural right.
26
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contractarian,”34 “radical,” and/or “revolutionary,”35 – but will settle just for “thoughtprovoking.”
It is not surprising that “[w]e will search the Federalist Papers in vain for an elaborate description of a
‘state of nature’ or a penetrating analysis of our ‘natural rights,’ Lockean or otherwise,” as Ackerman
points out – after all Madison, Hamilton and Jay were engaged in a fierce debate with the anti-federalists in
their efforts to persuade the states that the Constitution was not a betrayal of all that the Revolution had
stood for and accomplished, and they understandably countered with their own best arguments in the
Federalist Papers. The natural rights argument was a particularly difficult point for them to get around, so
better perhaps not to mention it at all. (Moreover, Despite their (justified) currency and stature today, The
Federalist Papers themselves were not the only word on the street in 1787. See, generally Bailyn, supra
note 6.) So, the fact that the Federalist Papers did not discuss natural rights does not mean that their
authors or the rest of the framing generation had abandoned the core idea certain rights are beyond the
reach of government – far from it. As outlined by Bernard Bailyn and Leonard Levy in their exhaustive
works on the literature of the Revolutionary era, there is an overwhelming abundance of material
supporting the point that the post-Revolutionary era did not abandon outright their core belief that certain
aspects of individual liberty are beyond the reach of government – state or federal.
30
See, e.g., Bailyn, supra note 6; Shapiro, supra note 18. John Locke’s theories formed the basis for much
of the Revolutionary era’s political theory, espoused once again herein. But this essay does not go all the
way to the sort of classic liberal “’Lockean consensus’ which trivialize[s] politics and glorifie[s] the natural
rights of isolated individuals to life, liberty, and the pursuit of property (or is it happiness?)…, look[s] upon
the state as an unmitigated threat to natural liberty…, [believes that t]he government that governs best
governs least…, [or the Marxist turn that] the only ‘really important’ use of state power is to serve as a
revolutionary mechanism for the long march from feudalism to capitalism to socialism.” Ackerman,
Foundations, supra note 27, at 25-26. This essay instead takes the position that effective government plays
a vital role in several areas, not the least of which in protecting individual rights like freedom of autonomy.
See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
31
The ideal of liberty and individual freedom of autonomy permeate Jefferson’s political philosophy.
32
Bruce Ackerman poses an interesting two-stage hypothetical (see Ackerman, Foundations, supra note 27,
at 16): First, what should be the approach of a Justice of the United States Supreme Court if confronted
with a case challenging a validly ratified constitutional amendment establishing Christianity “as the state
religion of the American people, and [forbidding] the public worship of other gods”? Should the Justice
hold that the amendment is somehow an unconstitutional violation of rights because it acts to repeal the
First Amendment’s Establishment Clause? The answer is “no” – fidelity to the constitutional process
requires that we accept the Constitution’s primacy, for better or worse – and an amendment properly
proposed and ratified through the Article V process is the highest law of the land which the judiciary must
respect. The proper responses for dissenters to such an amendment would be to: (a) work within the system
to try to repeal the amendment through the Article V process; or (b) separate/secede.
Second, would it be constitutionally appropriate for the Court to invalidate another validly-ratified
amendment stating: “Any American advocating the repeal of [the previous Christianity Amendment] is
hereby declared guilty of treason and subject to capital punishment upon conviction,” on the reasoning that
it unconstitutionally entrenches the amendment against any subsequent reconsideration by the People under
Article V? The committed constitutionalist’s answer is again “no” (although it’s tempting to say, like
Ackerman, that “such questions are best left to the dark day they arise”) – those proposing and ratifying the
amendment did so with full knowledge that the amendment would remove the question from any possible
further consideration, and they were even still able to mobilize the support specified by Article V to prevail.
The constitutional process should be respected. So what is a “liberal,” “rights foundationalist,”
“revolutionary” to do? Answer: As Ackerman says, it might “simply be best for all decent people to quit
the regime and struggle to overthrow it[.]” Id.. Agreed – at least with respect to the “quit the regime” part,
but perhaps without the “struggle to overthrow it” part; rather, the decent people should seek to
separate/secede/divide peacefully without starting a bloody Civil War.
33
The underlying premise of freedom of autonomy is the protection of civil liberty.
34
See Shapiro, supra note 18 at 109-10.
35
This essay asserts that rights must be protected from majority tyranny through judicial review; and when
judicial review is inadequate, through constitutional amendment; and when constitutional amendment is
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Section II explores progressively the nature of the right of freedom of autonomy, several presentday applications, and the right’s historical foundations, then asserts that nothing short of a
constitutional amendment prohibiting federal and state government from abridging any person’s
individual freedom of autonomy on matters of natural private concern will suffice in protecting
the right as it was envisioned at the time of America’s founding and reaffirmed in the
Reconstruction. The essay concludes by asserting that a greater awareness and vigilance by We
the People of the natural origins and history of the freedom of autonomy in the founding era is
vital if we are to revive this once -prized natural right to a position of prominence in twenty-first
century America.
II.

THE FREEDOM OF AUTONOMY

The premise of this thought-piece is that government in America has fallen far short of the
promise made in the Declaration and Bill of Rights, as reinforced by the fourteenth amendment,
for protecting individual liberties of equality and free choice on matters of natural private concern
(collectively “freedom of autonomy”) – a right considered throughout the pre-Revolutionary
years and at least into the early decades of the United States to be natural and virtually
inviolable.36
The individual right of freedom of autonomy exists in a pre-political state of nature, having been
granted by one’s own Creator, before and notwithstanding any attempted interference by false
government gods. People individually or collectively may choose to cede their own freedom of
autonomy (that too is part of the freedom), but under no circumstances may one person or group
of persons (e.g., government) make that decision for another or others against their will. Stated
another way, nothing – no person, no government - can take away, against one’s will, one’s Godgiven freedom of autonomy.37 People individually or collectively may decide to condition their
inadequate, either through stronger conceptions of state independence or perhaps even through separation
or secession if the oppression is serious enough. The latter courses, stronger conceptions of state
independence and the possibility of separation/secession, are discussed in forthcoming companion essay,
Freedom of Autonomy Evolution or Revolution.
36
Above all, the Revolutionary ideology “was dominated by a … cluster of convictions focused on the
effort to free the individual from the oppressive misuse of power, from the tyranny of the state.” BAILYN,
supra note 6 at v-vi. See also infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
37
Alexander Hamilton commented that “’the sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among
old parchments or musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human
nature, by the had of the divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power.’ Another
tough-minded American materialist had led the way to such thinking. John Dickinson, speaking of “the
rights essential to happiness,” rhapsodized: “We claim them from a higher source – from the King of
kings, and lord of all the earth. They are not annexed to us by parchment and seals. They are created in us
by the decrees of Providence, which establish the laws of our nature. They are born with us; exist with us;
and cannot be taken from us by any human power without taking our lives.” Id. at 25_. Hence comments
like Patrick Henry’s to “give me liberty or give me death.” Patrick Henry, “Give Me Liberty or Give Me
Death.”[cite] “In short, [these rights] are founded on the immutable maxims of reason and justice. Such
opinions were commonplace.” Levy, supra note 3, at 250 (italics added). “So, too, the directly related
views expressed by Jefferson in the preamble of the Declaration of Independence reflected commonly held
principles. In 1822 John Adams, who had been a member of the committee of Congress that Jefferson had
chaired in 1776, observed that there was ‘not an idea in it [the Declaration] but what had been hackneyed.’
Jefferson asserted that ‘all American whigs thought alike’ on those matters. The purpose of the
Declaration, he wrote, was not ‘to find out new principles, or new arguments … but to place before
mankind the common sense of the subject.’” Levy, supra note 3, at 250-51.
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right of freedom of autonomy, as they do when they consent to be governed, in return for certain
benefits from the government. The underlying Agreement memorializing the consent between
We the People and the government in America – the Constitution – requires that the government
must protect our freedom of autonomy from overbearing government and marauding majorities.
If government fails to uphold its part of the bargain in protecting this most basic natural
individual liberty, as it has in present-day America, We the People may hold the government in
breach and take alternative measures to recover the stolen right.
Lest one form a mistaken first impression about the broader implications of this “freedom of
autonomy as natural right” position, it assuredly does not disparage public service38 or advocate a
strict libertarian approach that government should have little or no role in all matters;39 rather, it
suggests that government has an important role,40 but acts legitimately only insofar as it protects
the individual’s “right to be let alone” as it does so. All government activity must be measured

38

Under this approach, civic republicanism – the participation of an informed, educated populace in the life
of the community - is a virtue.
39
We know too well from experience that human beings left entirely to their own devices are capable of
oppression and unspeakable cruelty in the name of God, country, or morality. Paraphrasing the old maxim,
those who fail to remember the mistakes of history are bound to repeat them. Idealism or utopianism or
nihilism aside, some form of government is necessary - people simply incapable of leaving each other
alone.
40
Consistent with the freedom of autonomy position, a fair system of taxation is necessary to support
responsible government spending in aiding education, supporting scientific research, providing healthcare
for all citizens, administering social security, guaranteeing unemployment benefits and yes, building a
strong defense – individual liberty is preserved only so long as the nation is safe from its enemies. “This
conception of governmental power is broad enough to embrace any conception of the state, from a
minimalist, night-watchman state to the contemporary European-style social welfare state. Whatever
version of the state a society chooses to adopt, a government must exist and must possess certain powers
that enable the polity collectively to achieve the goals that it sets for itself,” James A. Gardner, State
Constitutional Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a Functional Theory of State
Constitutios,91 Geo. L.J. 1003, 1011 (June, 2003), while at the same time instituting mechanisms to
prevent the state from infringing the personal liberties of the polity.
While it is not surprising that the freedom of autonomy position supports the operation of free markets and
their attendant freedoms in allowing people to enter easily into mutually beneficial economic arrangements,
it also recognizes the important role that government must play to assure a fair game. The position agrees
in principle with Bruce Ackerman’s assertion that, “[w]ithout … efforts to approximate undominated
equality, talk of a free market degenerates into an ideological apologia for the rich and powerful,”
Ackerman, Liberal Revolution, supra note 18, at 10, but keeps a wary eye on how government goes about
achieving “undominated equality.” In its efforts to provide equal economic opportunity, government must
not dampen individual initiative or remove legitimate private incentive. If a twenty-first century
perspective of the communist experiment – with the implosion and utter failure of the Soviet system,
together with the capitalist-in-fact activities of the Chinese - tells us anything, it is that the prospect of
private gain is a powerful incentive for enterprise and improved individual economic prospects. There are
natural consequences of the market, with winners and losers…. People must be allowed to be free to
compete free of an overbearing government.
That said, government is justified in involving itself in the operation of the free market, for example, to
adjust for market failure - where “real world markets fail to conform to ideal models of perfect
competition…. [S]tate interventions [here may range] from environmental contral to consumer protection
to the subsidized provision of old-age and health insurance.” Ackerman, Liberal Revolution, supra note
18, at 9-10 (citing Weimer & Vining, Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice (1989); Schulze, The Public
Use of the Private Interest (1977); Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution (1990)) (concluding that “[t]he
challenge … is to achieve structural conditions for the legitimate marketplace, not to destroy the genuine
freedom that the marketplace makes possible.”).

12

by this test: if the government’s action abridges an individual’s freedom of autonomy on matters
of natural private concern, presumptively it is not legitimate.41
To begin, as a matter of methodology, how does one determine (1) what rights are sufficiently
“natural” or “fundamental” as to merit protection from government interference; and (2) under
what circumstances, if ever, government can abridge a fundamental or natural right?
On the first, we look always to the U.S. Constitution. If the claimed right is not clearly defined
therein or is so ambiguous as to lead to uncertainty on whether it is constitutionally protected, in
the best common-law tradition we look to as many sources as possible – historical, philosophical,
theoretical, scientific, religious – and do our best through the power of reason to sift and
synthesize these sources into animating principles to help us form educated conclusions of
whether, pursuant to the ninth amendment “unenumerated rights” authority,42 the claimed right is
sufficiently “fundamental” or “natural” to merit protection under the due process clause, the
penumbra of the Bill of Rights, or elsewhere. It’s the best we can do, short of a pipeline to the
Almighty - a privilege so far as we know nobody has – fundamentalists’, governments’ and
athletes’ “God in my corner” claims notwithstanding. Criticisms of this approach as elitist are
41

Every tradition attempts in its own way to win political legitimacy. Ian Shapiro summarizes five postEnlightenment political traditions: utilitarianism, social contract, Marxism, anti-Enlightenment, and
democracy. See, generally, Shapiro, supra note 18. In the classical utilitarianism tradition, a government’s
legitimacy is “tied to their willingness and capacity to maximize happiness.” SHAPIRO, supra note 18, at 2.
Jeremy Bentham’s “happiness principle” “approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according
to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is
in question.” Id. at 18 (quoting Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1948 [1789]), p.1. Bentham’s principle of utility is
founded in the proposition that “pain and pleasure … govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think:
every effort we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In
words a man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while.”
Id. Legitimacy in the social contract tradition is “rooted in the idea of agreement …; [that is,] consent of
the governed, somehow understood (whether by actual agreement, as conceptualized by seventeenthcentury social contractarians John Locke and Thomas Hobbes; or by hypothetical agreement, as suggested
by twentieth-century theorists like John Rawls) is the source of the state’s legitimacy.” Shapiro, supra at 2,
110-12. In the Marxist tradition a government’s legitimacy is tied “to the degree that [it does not]
underwrite exploitation and … to the degree that [it] promote[s] its antithesis, human freedom,” Id.; in the
anti-Enlightenment tradition “to how well [it] embod[ies] communal values that shape, and give meaning
to, the lives of individuals,” Id. at 4, where notions of “self” are seen as “rooted in systems of attachment
and affiliation that precede and survive individuals.” Id., citing CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF:
THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY (Harvard 1992); and in the democratic tradition, legitimacy exists
“when those who are affected by decisions play an appropriate role in making them and when there are
meaningful opportunities to oppose the government of the day, replacing it with an alternative.” Id. at 5.
Ultimately, of course, the inquiry of whether a government is legitimate begs the seminal questions of
“Who is to judge, and by what criteria, whether the laws and actions of states that claim our allegiance
measure up?” Id. at 2 – questions answered in their own distinct ways by the various traditions with their
own unique “utility-ometers,” “consent-ometers,” “exploit-ometers,” “community-ometers” or “equalopportunity-ometers,” as the case may be.
42
Madison said that the ninth amendment was “meant to guard against the possibility that unenumerated
rights might be imperiled by the enumeration of particular rights. By excepting many rights from the grant
of powers, no implication was intended, and no inference should be drawn, that rights not excepted from
the grant of powers fell within those powers.” Levy, supra note 3, at 247.
The rights the ninth amendment protected “had to be either ‘natural rights’ or ‘positive rights,’ to use the
terms Madison employed in the notes for the great speech of June 8 advocating amendments [in which]
speech he distinguished ‘the preexistent rights of nature’ from those ‘resulting from a social compact.’” Id.
at 250.
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anti- intellectual and misplaced (all people, regardless of their station in life, may educate
themselves); whereas criticisms of the approach, relying as it does on judicial review,43 as
undemocratic are accurate – democracy is simply inadequate alone to protect individual rights, as
demonstrated time and again in America.
Applying this approach to our inquiry, the individual right to freedom of autonomy is
encompassed within the terms “liberty”44 and “property” in the fifth and fourteenth amendment
due process clauses45 - at least as those terms were originally46 understood during the
Revolutionary and Reconstruction eras. Leonard Levy reports, for example, that “[i]n the
eighteenth century property did not mean merely the ownership of material things. Locke himself
had not used the word to denote merely a right to things; he meant a right to rights…. Americans
of the founding generation understood property in this general Lockean sense….”47 As James
Madison said in 1792, a “larger and juster meaning [of the term property] … embraces … every
thing to which a man may attach a value and have a right…. [A] man has property in his opinions
and the free communication of them. He has a property of peculiar value in his religious
opinions, and in the profession and practices dictated by them. He has property very dear to him
in the safety and liberty of his person. He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties
and free choice of the objects on which to employ them. In a word, as a man is said to have a
right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights.”48
Under the Lockean and Madisonian terms, then, a proper definition of “property” would include
two aspects: (i) a right to material “things”; and (ii) a right to non-material “thing[s] to which a
man may attach a value and have a right.” The first “material” aspect of property has long been
43

Madison wrote, “‘independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the
legislative or executive, they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly
stipulated for in the constitution.’” Levy, supra note 3, at 36 (quoting Madison). For his part, “Jefferson
believed that an independent court could withstand oppressive majority impulses by holding
unconstitutional any acts violating a bill of rights…,” and wrote to Madison that “an advantage of a written
bill of rights was ‘the legal check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary.’” Levy, supra at 33 (quoting
Jefferson).
44
Freedom of autonomy encompasses, together with the Madison’s “perfect equality of mankind,” see
supra note 4, the “right of privacy” liberty interest recognized by the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Roe v.
Wade, __ U.S. __ (1973). The Court does not recognize the full scope of freedom of autonomy, however.
45
“nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law,” U.S. Const. Am. V; “nor hsall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law,” U.S. Const. Am.
XIV.
46
The “originalism” versus “non-originalism” debate, endlessly discussed by judges, lawyers and
academics, has become highly polarizing. We don’t join this discussion right now, except to say that for
our purposes it is vitally important to understand the original intent of the framers on concepts of “liberty,”
“property,” and “privileges or immunities,” because our very consent to be governed under the
Constitution’s terms was based upon the meanings of the terms at the time of ratification. The only way
we can know if the government is upholding its end of the bargain is if we know what the bargain was in
the first place.
47
Levy, supra note 3, at 252-53 (italics in original). Locke asserted, “[People] unite[] for the general
preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name – property…. [B]y
property I must be understood here as in other places to mean that property which men have in their
persons as well as goods.” Id. at 252-53 (quoting Locke, John, Second Treatise on Government [cite]).
Levy notes, “[a]t least four times in his Second Treatise, Locke used the word property to mean all that
belongs to a person, especially the rights he wished to preserve.” Id.
48
Madison, James (1792) (as quoted in Levy, supra note 3, at 252-53) (italics added). This broad view was
the Reconstruction interpretation as well. See infra notes 160, 161 and accompanying text.
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recognized by the judiciary under several constitutional provisions,49 the combination of which
have been effective in protecting individuals’ material property from an overreaching
government.
As for the “non-material” aspect of property, looking again at Madison’s description of property
we see that all of the examples he lists as constituting property are freedom of autonomy rights –
i.e, all are liberties involving an individual’s rights of equality and freedom of choice on matters
of natural private concern. Of those, most, but not all, are adequately protected elsewhere in the
Constitution: “opinions and free communication….” are explicitly protected by the first
amendment (free speech clause), as are “religious opinions, and … the[ir] profession and
practices” (free exercise clause); and “safety and liberty of his person” are also explicitly
protected by, for example, the eighth amendment (cruel and unusual punishment, excessive bail
clauses), and by the Art. I, section 9 right of writ of habeas corpus. Only “free use of his faculties
and free choice of the objects on which to employ them” – classic “freedom of autonomy” rights are nowhere else explicitly protected in the constitution – and the fact is courts have never
protected this form of property, so “we have lost [it].” 50 This is why we need a constitutional
amendment to protect freedom of autonomy.
Continuing with our inquiry, since freedom of autonomy has never been adequately recognized or
protected by the U.S. Supreme Court under the (apparently) ambiguous terms “liberty” and
“property,” we look to other sources, where we find overwhelming evidence to support a
conclusion that freedom of autonomy is a “natural right” entitled to full constitutional
protection.51
On the second question of when, if ever, government can abridge a fundamental or natural right,
we have at least a couple choices: (a) government is absolutely prohibited from infringing the
right, under any circumstances, along the lines of Justice Black’s position on government
abridgments of speech; or (b) government is prohibited from infringing the right unless it
demonstrates a compelling interest for doing so, and its infringement is narrowly-tailored.52

49

Specifically, material property is protected by the fifth amendment takings clause (the Court has
developed a rich takings clause jurisprudence in which the judiciary will find unconstitutional any
government action that works an uncompensated physical or regulatory taking of the individual’s property.
see, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission, __ U.S. __ (1992)(holding that a government action
depriving an owner of virtually all of the property’s value is a taking); the fourth amendment search and
seizure clause; the Article I, section 10 contracts clause; and the fifth and fourteenth amendment due
process clauses). The fifth amendment takings clause and the fourth amendment search & seizure clause
are incorporated to apply to the states through the 14th amendment due process clause.
Professor Amar notes, “There is a conspicuous connection between the Fourth Amendment’s limitations on
‘seizures’ of ‘houses’ and ‘effects’ and the Fifth’s restrictions on ‘takings’ of ‘private property.’ In both
cases, state law typically defines the property rights given constitutional protection against federal
officials…. [Moreover,] [i]n both the Fourth Amendment and the takings clause, civil juries of ordinary
people loomed large in providing justice to citizens aggrieved by governmental grabbing – by helping
decide which searches were ‘reasonable,’ whether punitive damages should be awarded to deter outrageous
governmental misconduct, and what kind of compensation would be ‘just.’” Amar, supra note 8, at 80.
50
Levy, supra note 3, at 252.
51
See supra notes 44-48; infra Section II.A.. Amar describes a hierarchy of protection, where the most
fundamental “natural” rights are protected regardless of whether there is equal treatment; and where
“positive” rights (privileges granted by government) require equal treatment. “Equality” is itself a natural
right of freedom of autonomy entitled to full protection.
52
This is the Court’s current strict-scrutiny approach to government intrusions on fundamental rights.
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The balance in determining the appropriate involvement of government is delicate – reasonable
minds may, and do, differ on this point. It would be easy to say that government should be
absolutely prohibited from ever infringing the right, but this essay suggests that the latter strictscrutiny approach would provide adequate protection for a newly-revived individual right of
freedom of autonomy (assuming in the first place that there is no question that the freedom of
autonomy is “natural” or “fundamental” – a certainty that can be assured only with constitutional
amendment)53, while at the same time recognizing and accommodating the practical complexities
of governing in a pluralistic nation of 300 million people.
The first amendment protection of freedom of speech54 provides a useful analogue. The Court
has made it clear through its first amendment doctrine that absolute abridgements of speech will
be upheld only in the very most extreme of circumstances, and partial deprivations only if in line
with rigid guidelines.55 Generally speaking, strict scrutiny review is applied if the abridgement is
content-based, and intermediate scrutiny is applied if it is content-neutral, in which case
reasonable content-neutral “time, place and manner restrictions” – i.e., those that provide
reasonable alternatives for the speech – may be upheld.56 Federal and state policymakers have
come to understand these guidelines and so are careful in trying to write laws and regulations that
will comply - thus providing a self-regulating mechanism for protecting speech.
The newly-revived freedom of autonomy, as explicitly stated in a constitutional amendment57
would have a similar effect on policymakers as they come to understand the following judicial
doctrine enforcing the new twenty-eighth amendment: absolute deprivations of freedom of
autonomy will be upheld in only the very most extreme of circumstances, and partial deprivations
only if in line with rigid guidelines. Again, as with the first amendment approach, strict scrutiny
would be applied if the abridgement of the freedom of autonomy is content-based, and
intermediate scrutiny if content-neutral, under which reasonable time, place and manner
restrictions may be upheld.58

A.

The Nature of the Right

A natural place to start any discussion of individual liberty (and, for purposes of this essay,
freedom of autonomy) is with John Stuart Mill’s famous “harm principle”:
[There is but] one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of
society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control, … that the sole end for
which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of
action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
53

See infra Section II.D.
The first amendment states that “Congress shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech,.” U.S.
Constitution Am. I.
55
The judiciary’s 1st amendment speech doctrine holds that any governmental abridgment of speech is
presumed to be unconstitutional and will be upheld only if the government meets the burden of
demonstrating that it meets the appropriate heightened standard of review. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Erwin,
Constitutional Law __. A similar sort of framework could be applied to the freedom of autonomy.
56
cite
57
Citations we’d like to see: “Neither Congress nor any State shall make or enforce any law abridging any
person’s individual freedom of autonomy on matters of natural private concern.” U.S. Constit. Am.
XXVIII. See infra Section II.D. .
58
See infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text for additional discussion.
54
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prevent harm to others…. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable
to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual
is sovereign.59
The harm principle captures the essence of the freedom of autonomy the framers “conferred, as
against the government[:] the right to be let alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.”60 Stated several other ways (it cannot be stated too
frequently): government may not prohibit private individual behavior or action causing no harm
to another; or on matters of natural private concern, an individual has the full right to behave or
act in the manner of his or her choosing free of government interference; or government acts
legitimately only insofar as it protects the individual’s right to be left alone on matters of natural
private concern.
Freedom of autonomy as conceptualized in this essay might be described as a sharpened version
of the Millian harm principle – sharpened, that is, to eliminate “social coercion” from its list of
“harms” that must be prohibited.61 When it comes to social coercion, people simply need to
59

J.S. Mill, On Liberty 13 (1859, reprinted in Cambridge 2000). Shapiro writes, “think of the harm
principle as operating in two steps. When evaluating a particular action or policy, the first step involves
deciding whether the action causes, or has the potential to cause, harm to others. If the answer is no, then
the action is in the self-regarding realm and the government would be unjustified in interfering. Indeed, in
that case the government has a duty to protect the individual’s freedom of action against interference from
others as well. If, however, the answer to the initial query is yes, then different considerations arise. We
are then in a world in which harm is being committed willy-nilly, and the question is: What, if anything,
should the government do about it? In this regard, a more accurate summation of the harm principle than
the more famous formulation already quoted can be found at the start of chapter four: ‘As soon as any part
of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the
question whether the general welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it becomes open to
discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any such discussion when a person’s conduct affects the
interests of no persons besides himself.’” Shapiro, supra note 18, at 61 (quoting John Stuart Mill, On
Liberty (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978 [1859], p. 73).
60
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at __ (Brandeis, J. dissenting). See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
61
Jed Rubenfeld argues effectively in Freedom and Time (Yale 2001) that Mill goes too far in adding
freedom from social coercion to freedom from legal coercion to the formula for determining “the limit to
the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence.” Jed Rubenfeld, Freedom
and Time 230 (Yale 2001). Mill states,
As soon as any part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has
jurisdiction over it…. But … when a person’s conduct affects the interests of no person besides
himself, or needs not affect them unless they like … there should be a perfect freedom, legal and
social, to do the action and stand the consequences.
Id. (quoting John Stuart Mill, On Liberty [1859], in On Liberty and Considerations on Representative
Government lviii (R.B. McCallum ed., Oxford 1946)(italics added). Rubenfeld points out that by so
asserting, Mill open[s] himself up to “three “startling internal paradoxes that the old arguments have
overlooked.” Id. at 231. Specifically, on one hand Mill asserts that in determining what sort of “harm” is
sufficient, there must be “direct harm to others … [and] definite damages, or a definite risk of damage….
[M]inor … inconvenien[ces that do not] … prejudicially affect” others are not enough to justify society’s
legitimate interference with individual independence. Id. (quoting and citing Mill, supra at 67-73). On the
other hand, though, in criticizing and seeking to forbid the “social tyranny” and “despotism of custom” that
would stunt individual freedom, Mill is himself “engaged in the putatively non-regulable conduct that
liberalism is supposed to protect. What is floridly called ‘social tyranny,’ what is most threatening to
individual autonomy, in fact turns out to be itself an exercise of individual autonomy – by the intolerant.”
Id. at 230-31 (quoting and citing Mill, supra at _). According to Rubenfeld, then, “the individualist,
Millian liberalism that we admire so much … is itself the source of standardization that liberalism fears.”
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develop means other than legal recourse to deal with the problem.62 It is only when social
coercion gives way to official legal coercion,63 or perhaps when it becomes so oppressive and
systematic as to amount to virtual official coercion,64 that this essay’s freedom of autonomy
definition of “harm” is implicated.
This narrower sharpened version of the harm principle does not fear standardization per se but
rather accepts it as a fact of life, as long as those who would be “standardized” do so of their own
will, free of legal coercion. Some degree of standardization is to be expected and, indeed, desired
- it’s called community. And as much as Burkean or communitarian critics would have us
believe it to be so,65 individualist liberalism and community are not mutually exclusive
concepts.66 Community provides positive, nurturing social arrangements for human beings, who
are, after all, social beings.67 The value of community diminishes greatly, though, if it loses its
elective character.68
Id. at 232. The second and third paradoxes in On Liberty, according to Rubenfeld, are that (2) Mill,
decrying the proliferation of newspapers and their use by Englishmen as a source for ‘tak[ing] their
opinions,’ Id. at 232 n.32 (quoting Mill, supra at 59), “rais[es] an alarm at the prospect of all individuals
obtaining the ‘same rights and liberties, and the same means of asserting them.’” Id. at 232 (quoting Mill,
supra at 4 and/or 59); and (3) “liberal liberty breaks down the ascriptive, status-based distinctions formerly
separating class from class, man from woman, man from man, thereby making it possible for ‘the people’
to become ‘a people,’ with a popular will that might be made to govern.” Id. at 234.
62
Unfortunately people can be mean – that much is evident from a very early age on the playground.
Difficult though it is, a person behaving in a way that is in variance with that of the “crowd” on the
playground of life needs to develop a thick skin and/or be willing to push back from time to time.
63
When the school principal exercises the authority of the office to give the outlier person detention, as it
were….
64
Extending the analogy once more, … when the principal stands by the side of the playground and
observes with arms folded while the crowd torments and ridicules the outlier person day in and day out, for
example.
65
“What is often taken to be the central issue between liberals and their communitarian critics – the
constitution of the self. Liberalism, it is commonly said, is founded on the idea of a presocial self, a
solitary and sometimes heroic individual confronting society, who is fully formed before the confrontation
begins. Communitarian critics then argue, first, that instability and dissociation are the actual and
disheartening achievement of individuals of this sort and, second, that there really cannot be individuals of
this sort. The [communitarian] critics are commonly said in turn to believe in a radically socialized self
that can never ‘confront’ society because it is, from the beginning, entangled in society, itself the
embodiment of social values…. Neither of these views can be sustained for long by anyone who goes
beyond staking out a position and tries to elaborate an argument. WALZER, MICHAEL, POLITICS AND
PASSION 161-63 (Yale 2004).
66
Michael Walzer points out that “[l]iberalism is distinguished less by the freedom to form groups on the
basis of these identities than by the freedom to leave the groups and sometimes even the identities behind.
Association is always at risk in a liberal society. The boundaries of the group are not policed; people come
and go, or they just fade into the distance without ever quite acknowledging that they have left…. At its
best, the liberal society is the ‘social union of social unions’ that John Rawls described: a pluralism of
groups bonded by shared ideas of toleration and democracy. Walzer, supra note 65, at 155.
67
The ideal picture of autonomous individuals choosing their connections (and disconnections) without
constraints of any sort is an example of bad utopianism. It has never made sense to sociologists, and it
ought to inspire skepticism among political theorists and moral philosophers, too. No human society could
survive without [some] connections….” True enough, “[i]nvoluntary association is a permanent feature of
social existence, and the people who fight for equality, like those who struggle to be free, are inevitably its
creatures,” and to be sure, “[d]enial is foolish, and abolition is impossible…. [But] aren’t involuntary
associations, the sentiments they generate, and the values they inculcate, a threat to the very idea of
[freedom of autonomy]?… [No,] [i]t is not pure voluntarism that freedom requires but the possibility of
opposition and escape.” Walzer, supra note 65, at 1, 2.
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It is difficult at first to grasp the full magnitude of the freedom of autonomy concept – that
individuals have total freedom on matters of natural private concern.69 “No, it can’t be,” we say,
“there must be a catch.” But the only “catch” is that we have become so conditioned to being told
by government – mere people, after all, but acting under the guise and false authority of
“government” - how we may behave, that it seems impossible to believe we may really be so free.
We must constantly remind ourselves, and continue to insist in the face of an overbearing
government, that this freedom is rightfully ours in the first instance – freedom of autonomy is the
rule in nature, not the exception – and it is accordingly the government70 that has been acting
Walzer identifies four kinds of involuntary associations faced by all persons from very early in life: (1)
familial and social (“We are born members of a kin group, of a nation or country, and of a social class; and
we are born male or female. These … attributes go a long way toward determining the people with whom
we associate for the rest of our lives….” WALZER, supra note 65, at 4; (2) cultural dictates (“Associates
may choose one another, but they rarely have much to say about the structure and style of their association.
Marriage is the obvious example…. [The] meaning and the responsibilities [marriage] entails are accepted
by the partners as soon as they acknowledge one another as husband and wife…. Even radically new
associational practices are likely to mimic old forms – the way gay unions mimic the modern nuclear
family and aim at the same legal recognition.” Walzer, supra note 65, at 6; (3) political (“[W]e are born
citizens … and are rarely invited to agree to our citizenship…. The political community is in an important
sense a union shop. If you are here, and if you stay here, you are caught up in a set of arrangements that
you had no part in designing…. [Like union members, citizens] can choose to vote or not, to join this or
that party or movement, to form a caucus or oppositional faction, or to avoid political activity entirely….
[But] there is one thing they can’t do: they can’t work or live someplace and refuse the rights of citizenship
– and the burdens, too, such as taxes and union dues.”); and (4) moral – people “hear an internal voice of
constraint, telling them that they should do this or that, …. In time of trouble [one’s nation, race or
religion, for example, people may feel themselves to be morally] bound to stay and help their fellow
citizens…. Even if they have been unenthusiastic, even negligent citizens, never hurrying to public
assemblies, never voting, they [may] still [feel] obligated…. Now I must not walk away. Indeed, I am
likely to acknowledge the constraint even if I refuse to respect it – by the excuses I offer, the urgent reasons
I invent, as I pack my bags.”) Walzer, supra note 65, at 9-10.
68
“What makes any identity or affiliation voluntary is the easy availability of alternative identities and
affiliations. What makes a marriage voluntary, [for example,] is the permanent possibility of divorce.”
Walzer, supra note 65, at 161-63. In this sense the idea of separation / secession, see infra Section II, is
itself a liberal idea – the national association is voluntary.
69
On matters of positive (i.e. having been granted by government), as opposed to natural, private concern,
the freedom is not “total,” but rather “relative” in the sense that irrational discrimination is prohibited. See
infra note 78 and accompanying text for discussion of two-tier analysis.
Rawlsian concepts are helpful in describing the sort of equality that exists within freedom of autonomy:
“Opportunities are thought about differently in the Rawlsian scheme. Ignorant of their religion, race,
ethnicity, gender, or social status behind the veil of ignorance, people would resist any caste, apartheid, or
gender-biased regimes, as well as systems with religious tests for office. Assuming that they would always
be in the group disadvantaged by the denial of equality of access to advancement, they would instead
embrace a principle of equality of opportunity…. This would presumably be a sufficiently robust principle
to support equal pay for equal work, and rule out the kinds of systematic gender inequalities we see on this
front in the contemporary United States.” Shapiro, supra note 18, at 132-33.
70
Friedrich Nietzsche wrote about the dangers of government in his own inimitable fashion:
State is the name of the coldest of all cold monsters…. And this lie crawls out of its mouth: ‘I, the
state, am the people.’ That is a lie! It was creators who created peoples…. It is annihilators who
set traps for the many and call them ‘state’: they hang a sword and a hundred appetites over
them…. It has invented its own language of customs and rights…. Behold, how it lures them, the
all- too-many – and how it devours them, chews them, and ruminates! ‘On earth there is nothing
greater than I: the ordering finger of God am I’ – thus roars the monster…. Alas, to you too, you
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inappropriately all along in “creat[ing] a society with a network of small complicated rules,
minute and uniform, that none can escape…. [leading then to a citizenry] reduced to nothing
better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd.”71
It is OUR individual freedom – and we must reclaim it from government.72 If we continue to
accept this status quo, we really are just timid sheep, as Tocqueville predicted.
The founding and framing generations had a deep aversion to the unjust exercise of political
“power,” aware as they were of its rapacious nature,73 knowing that the governed must be ever
vigilant to keep it at bay within its assigned confines.74 “‘Power’ to them meant the dominion of
some men over others, the human control of human life: ultimately, force, compulsion…. Most
great souls, it whispers its dark lies…. It will give you everything if you will adore it, this new
idol: thus it buys the splendor of your virtues and the look of your proud eyes…. My brothers, do
you want to suffocate …? Rather break the windows and leap to freedom…. Only where the state
ends, there begins the human being who is not superfluous: there begins… the unique and
inimitable tune. Where the state ends – look there, my brothers!
NIETZSCHE, FRIEDRICH, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA: A BOOK FOR ONE AND ALL 48-51 (188_, Penguin
ed. 1978 Walter Kauffman transl.).
Granted, Nietzsche is over the top, but the point is valid that government will, if allowed to do so,
insidiously inject its own “customs and rights” in place of those of the individual. That is precisely the
point of this essay – that government has stolen individual freedom of autonomy in America.
71
Dahl, supra note 6, at 233 (quoting Tocqueville, supra note 19).
72
This view of the nature of rights is reflected “ in Ohioan Salmon P. Chase’s famous oral argument in the
1847 fugitive slave case of Jones v. Van Zandt: ‘The provisions of the constitution, contained in the
amendments … rather announce restrictions upon legislative power, imposed by the very nature of society
and of government, than create restrictions, which, were they erased from the constitution, the Legislature
would be at liberty to disregard. No Legislature is … at liberty to disregard…. the fundamental principles
of rectitude and justice.” Amar, supra note 8, and accompanying text at 161-62.
73
“Not that power was in itself – in some metaphysical sense – evil. It was natural in its origins, and
necessary. It had legitimate foundations ‘in compact and mutual consent’ – in those covenants among men
by which, as a result of restrictions voluntarily accepted by all for the good of all, society emerges from a
state of nature and creates government to serve as trustee and custodian of the mass of surrendered
individual powers.” Power created legitimately by those voluntary compacts which the colonists knew
from Lockean theory to be logical and from their own experience to be practical, power in its legitimate
form inhered naturally in government and was the possession and interest of those who controlled
government, just as liberty, always weak, always defensive, always, as John Adams put it, ‘skulking about
in corners … hunted and persecuted in all countries by cruel power,’ inhere naturally in the people and was
their peculiar possession and interest.” Bailyn, supra note 6 at 58-59. “[T]he point they hammered home
time and again, and agreed on – freethinking Anglican literati no less than neo-Calvinist theologians – was
the incapacity of the species, of mankind in general, to withstand the temptations of power. Such is ‘the
depravity of mankind,’ Samuel Adams, speaking for the Boston Town Meeting, declared, ‘that ambition
and lust of power above the law are … predominant passions in the breasts of most men.’ “Power
‘converts a good man in private life to a tyrant in office.’ It acts upon men like drink: it ‘is known to be
intoxicating in its nature’ – ‘too intoxicating and liable to abuse.’ And nothing within man is sufficiently
strong to guard against these effects of power – certainly not ‘the united considerations of reason and
religion,’ for they have never ‘been sufficiently powerful to restrain these lusts of men.’ [citing Eliot,
sermon (JHL 15), pp. 10-11, etc. Bailyn, supra note 6, at 60.
74
An influential writing of the day, “Molesworth’s An Account of Denmark (1694)[,] established the
general point … that the preservation of liberty rested on the ability of the people to maintain effective
checks on the wielders of power, and hence in the last analysis rested on the vigilance and moral stamina of
the people.” Bailyn, supra note 6, at 65. Bailyn writes, “The acuteness of the colonists’ sense of this
problem is, for the twentieth-century reader, one of the most striking things to be found in this eighteenthcentury literature: it serves to link the Revolutionary generation to our own in the most intimate way.” Id.
at 57-58.
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commonly the discussion of power centered on its essential characteristic of aggressiveness: its
endlessly propulsive tendency to expand itself beyond legitimate boundaries….”75
Of course we the people understand that we cannot have absolute free reign – we do, after all, live
in a nation with three hundred million other souls, and to the extent our behavior harms or
concerns others, we accept that we must yield.76 Moreover, we understand that even if our
behavior does not harm or concern others, government may in the proper circumscribed exercise
of its responsibilities sometimes find it necessary to impose, within strict guidelines, “reasonable
content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions” that may affect our activity.77
We also understand we may expect a different level of constitutional protection depending on
whether our activity involves a natural right or a positive right. Classic “freedom of autonomy”
rights are natural rights, those pre-political liberties existing as a part of the greater Order
possessed by every individual from birth that cannot be extinguished by any mere human
government, are entitled to full protection; whereas positive rights, those granted through the
political process (common-law, state law, federal law, or otherwise) are entitled to relative
equality of protection (i.e. the government may not arbitrarily discriminate in granting and
enforcing those rights.)78 So, for example, whereas sexual freedom and freedom of association
75

“The essence of what the colonists meant by power was perhaps best revealed by John Adams as he
groped for words in drafting his Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law. Twice choosing and then
rejecting the word ‘power,’ he finally selected as the specification of the thought he had in mind
‘dominion,’ and in this association of words the whole generation concurred…. All sorts of metaphors,
similes, and analogies were used to express this view of power. The image most commonly used was that
of the act of trespassing. Power, it was said over and over again, has ‘an encroaching nature’; … ‘if at first
it meets with no control [it] creeps by degrees and quick subdues the whole.’ Sometimes the image is of
the human hand, ‘the hand of power,’ reaching out to clutch and to seize: power is ‘grasping’ and
‘tenacious’ in its nature; ‘what it seizes it will retain.’ … It is everywhere in public life, and everywhere it
is threatening, pushing and grasping; and too often in the end it destroys its benign – necessarily benign –
victim. [citing selections “from innumerable discussions of power in the literature before 1776”]. What
gave transcendent importance to the aggressiveness of power was the act that its natural prey, its necessary
victim, was liberty, or law, or right. The public world these writers saw was divided into distinct,
contrasting, and innately antagonistic spheres: the sphere of [government] power and the sphere of liberty
or right. The one was brutal, ceaselessly active, and heedless; the other was delicate, passive, and
sensitive. The one must be resisted, the other defended, and the two must never be confused . ‘Right and
power … have very different meanings, and convey very different ideas’; ‘power abstracted from right
cannot give a just title to dominion,’ nor is it possible legitimately, or even logically, to ‘build right upon
power.’ When the two are intermingled, when ‘brutal power’ becomes ‘an irresistible argument of
boundless right’ as it did, John Dickinson explained, under the Cromwellian dictatorship, ‘innocence and
justice can only sigh and quietly submit.’” Bailyn, supra note 6, at 57-58 (citations omitted)(italics added).
76
The devil is in the details of course – in this case, what does it mean to “harm” or “concern” others? To
be sure, in a butterfly-effect sense, one’s activity always affects others in some way, however
infinitesimally, but for our purposes the terms are strictly defined - to use a tort or criminal law analogue,
there must be some cognizable “injury.” One’s actions emphatically do NOT “harm” or “concern” if they
“disgust,” “repulse,” “anger,” “upset,” “disappoint,” or otherwise “offend” others. Others’ own opinions
on moral and social issues are just that – opinions; and their opinions do not rule us. We don’t presume to
tell others how to live their lives – and we especially don’t attempt to add the coercive powers of
government to impose our opinions on them - and we expect and demand the same treatment in return.
77
As with the Court’s analogous first amendment doctrine, the key is that the regulation does not work an
outright ban on the activity – the activity may still occur at a alternative reasonable time or place, or in an
alternative reasonable manner. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
78
Professor Amar proposes this sort of two-tier system as a tool for assigning the proper level of protection
originally contemplated for various “privileges-or-immunities” of Section I of the fourteenth amendment:
“Section I is not limited to privileges and immunities specified in the pre-1866 Constitution. Other,
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are natural rights and thus entitled to full protection; marriage of any description (same-sex,
different-sex) is entitled to equal protection as a positive right.79 Under similar reasoning,
freedom of association (in all circumstances, economic included) is a natural right and thus
entitled to full protection; whereas, economically-based associations created by state law or by
common-law (e.g., contracts), are positive rights entitled to equal protection.80

B.

Freedom of Autonomy Applied

Consider five activities: three currently prohibited by government – same-sex marriage (sexual
freedom), right to die; and possession/use of soft drugs;81 one formerly prohibited and currently
under heavy attack - abortion; and one protected from the beginning, but becoming less wellprotected in the modern era - religion. We could go on, but for our purposes, the point is
illustrated by these several examples.82

Same-sex Marriage (Sexual Freedom) The institution of marriage, created as it is by commonlaw and state law, is a positive right entitled to equal constitutional protection;83 whereas sexual
common-law rights were also included…. For those nonconstitutional rights, perhaps only
antidiscrimination (“equal”) protection should be accorded, rather than fundamental rights (“full”)
protection.” Amar, supra note 8, at 178 (Citing John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 1385 (1992); “For similar views, see 1 D. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
court 347-350 (1985); William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment 115-24 (1988);” also citing Earl M.
Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 Am.J. Legal Hist. 305, 323
(1988)(“similar analysis of two-tiered full-and-equal-protection philosophy in antebellum jurisprudence”).
Amar doesn’t use the terms “natural law” and “positive law” in this passage (perhaps they are implicit), but
the same two-tier system is useful in determining the proper level of protection for those rights, not
otherwise explicitly “specified and ‘declared’ by We the People [in the Constitution and hence] easy cases
for full protection,” Amar, supra note 8, at 179 fn.*, that exist as a matter of natural law (deserving of
“full” protection) as opposed to positive law (deserving of “equal” protection). It also bears repeating that
the right of equality generally, free of context, is a natural right entitled to full protection. See supra note
51.
79
See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
80
Amar offers the two-tier approach as a possible solution to the troubling “specter of judges invalidating
statutes by invoking nontextually specified fundamental rights and by giving constitutional status to
common-law rights like freedom of contract… [a la] Lochner: But [the fact] that the privileges-orimmunities clause applie[s] to various common-law rights may not necessarily lead us to Lochner.” Amar,
supra note 8 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
81
Many – perhaps even most - Americans will respond, “Of course these activities are prohibited – what
sort of decent society would not do the same?” A literal answer would be, “Decent countries not doing the
same include, to varying degrees, The Netherlands, Belgium, and more recently, Canada.” This is where
Americans must be reconditioned to reframe the question to one that more accurately reflects the spirit of
the modern Enlightenment and of America’s own founding generation, “I may personally disagree with the
activities, but what sort of decent government would [deign to] presume to tell individuals how they should
and should not behave?”
82
“Life” itself might be said to be the ultimate autonomy freedom, in which event the U.S. Supreme
Court’s allowance under the 5th and 14th amendment due process clauses of federal and state governments’
use of the death sentence would violate this freedom. The death sentence is an entirely separate discussion
– those convicted of capital crimes in those states allowing the death penalty have caused grievous harm to
another. Because this essay’s “freedom of autonomy” is premised on liberty to act in any way that does not
harm another, this essay does not include “life” in its definition of .freedom of autonomy.
83
See supra note 78 and accompanying text for description of two-tier framework designating “full”
protection for natural rights and “equal” protection for positive rights.
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freedom, the individual liberty one would exercise within any marriage,84 is a natural right
entitled to full constitutional protection. This much has been recognized (sort of) by the Supreme
Court in the 2003 case Lawrence v. Texas,85 which held that private sexual activity is protected as
right of privacy under the fourteenth amendment due process clause.86 While Lawrence was an
important victory for freedom of autonomy, the very narrowness of the margin (6-3 and 5-4) is
telling on the point that freedom of autonomy protection, even where it exists, is tenuous at best demonstrating yet again the need for constitutional amendment to provide more lasting
protection.
As noted, marriage is a positive right entitled to equal constitutional protection. This much most
assuredly has not been recognized by the Supreme Court, by the thirteen states passing
constitutional amendments in 2004 banning same-sex marriage,87 or by numerous other
governmental bodies that discriminate against same-sex couples. Government offers legal
recognition to married couples. With legal recognition comes certain benefits; for example,
spouses are entitled by law to social security benefits, consideration under intestacy statutes,
medical insurance, etc. of their spouse. By electing to extend these benefits to one group of
people (heterosexual couples), but not to another (same-sex couples), based on the manner that
the two groups exercise an underlying natural right entitled to full constitutional protection,
government engages in irrational discrimination and deprives the individuals in the same-sex
couples of their freedom of autonomy.
If I decide I want to marry another man, my action does not harm or injure another. Does it
disgust some and repulse others? Yes. But the fact that majorities may find the private activities
of a disfavored minority distasteful or even repulsive does not give the majority a right, through
abusive and illegitimate use of government mechanisms, to impose their own values on the
minority. If the majority decides instead to remove legal recognition of marriage for all, it may

To the extent that one might suggest that polygamy should likewise be treated equally under the two-tier
framework, I’d respond that freedom of autonomy does not extend to associations where the terms are
extremely unfavorable toward one class of people (in this case women) who possess a severe deficit of
bargaining power. See, generally, Jon Krakauer, Under the Banner of Heaven: A Story of Violent Faith
(2003) on some of the realities of the institution of polygamy.
84
Freedom of association is another natural right one exercises in making a decision to marry – a right that
is on firm footing in the Court’s first amendment speech doctrine.
85
__ U.S. __ (2003).
86
Lawrence, __ U.S. at __. The Court struck down a state law prohibiting certain specified sexual
behavior (sodomy) on two separate grounds: (a) substantive due process (privacy); and (b) equal
protection. Reversing its earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, __ U.S. __ (1986), which had held that
government infringements on private sexual activity were entitled to deferential rational-basis review. The
Lawrence Court “sort-of” recognized that sexual freedom is entitled to full protection in that it never
explicitly called it a “fundamental” right (its code word for a right entitled to strict scrutiny review), instead
saying simply that government actions limiting sexual freedom are subject to “heightened review,” and that
the government failed here to meet its burden. Lawrence, __ U.S. at __. See Randy Barnett, Justice
Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 21 (writing that “what was
most striking about Lawrence was the way the Court justified its ruling. If the approach the Court took in
the case is followed in other cases in the future, we have in Lawrence nothing short of a constitutional
revolution, with implications reaching far beyond the "personal liberty" at issue here…. [T]he Lawrence
majority did not protect a "right of privacy." Instead, quite simply, they protected "liberty.").
87
See supra note 9 for comment that the amendments were ostensibly to ban same-sex marriage, but in
fact their intent and scope are far broader than that in curbing the rights of gay Americans.
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legitimately do so,88 but it may not disfavor one group by failing to extend the same positive
rights to that group as it does to the favored group.
Even if one’s sexual orientation were a matter of choice,89 arguments suggesting that same-sex
marriage threatens the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage ignorantly fail to account
for the innate biological drive to perpetuate the species. There are few instincts more powerful as long as humans continue to walk the face of the earth, a critical mass will enter into
associations, such as heterosexual marriage, that lend themselves to the perpetuation of the
species. Biology does not need the help of moralistic conservative Christians. Moreover, and
perhaps more basically still, how can long-term committed loving relationships be wrong, to the
point where government will not support them?
In sum, the fact that the judiciary does not consistently90 recognize the obvious equal protection
problems91 in such discrimination is ample evidence that judicial review, important as it is,
ultimately is inadequate to protect the freedom of autonomy rights of an oppressed minority from
majority tyranny.

Right to Die I may have a terminal physical condition that irreparably impairs my quality of life
and elect, after much thought, that I wish to end my suffering by hastening my own death. Does
my action harm or injure others? No. Does it upset and offend some others? Yes. But as Bishop
John Shelby Spong,92 an articulate Christian spokesperson favoring choice in end-of-life
decisions, puts it, “I believe that if and when a person arrives at that point in human existence
when death has become a kinder alternative than hopeless pain … then the basic human right to
choose how and when to die should be guaranteed by law and respected by our communities of
faith…. My deepest desire is always to choose death with dignity over a life that has become
either hopelessly painful and dysfunctional or empty and devoid of all meaning…. That does not
seem to me to be too much to ask my faith to give me or my government to guarantee for me.”93
88

The Supreme Court has held that the right to marry, as part of the larger right of family autonomy, is
fundamental. Loving v. Virginia, __ U.S. __ (19__). In this context, “fundamental” is not analogous to
“natural.” Marriage, though described as “fundamental” by the Court for purposes of its substantive due
process privacy doctrine, simply is not a natural right. To the extent the Court would suggest otherwise, it
misconceives the right. The fact that the state does not endorse a particular institution does not mean that
people may not continue to exercise the natural right of association to cohabitate and spend their lives
together and consider themselves as “married” for their own purposes, but the state is not required to
recognize the institution in the first place.
89
There are many arguments for and against on this point – with the more persuasive that one’s sexual
orientation is not a matter of choice; rather, it is innate. It matters not one whit one way or another to the
freedom of autonomy principle.
90
Courts are all over the board on this. See infra note 173.
91
Put it this way: If a recount of votes in Florida in the 2000 presidential election, as had been ordered (as
required under state law) by the highest court in the sovereign state of Florida, violates the equal protection
of voters, see Bush v. Gore, __ U.S. __ (2000), certainly failing to extend the same marriage benefits to a
person based on the fact s/he wishes to marry someone of the same gender is also an equal protection
violation.
92
Eighth Bishop of Newark of the Episcopal Church. At the time of his retirement in 2000 Bishop Spong
was the senior active bishop in the Episcopal Church in the United States.
93
John Shelby Spong, Death: A Friend to be Welcomed Not an Enemy to be Defeated, An address to the
national Convention of the Hemlock Society in San Diego California, 1, 11, January 10, 2003. Available
at http://www.endoflifechoices.org/learn/index.jsp, visited April 8, 2005. Bishop Spong, on the credibility
of Christian moralizing about the sanctity of life: “If human beings who call themselves Christians have no
scruples about endorsing war, killing religious enemies or imposing the sentence of death upon those who
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And there are government voices of reason on this issue as well, such as California Assembly
member Lloyd Levine commenting in support of the Compassionate Choice Act of 2005, an aidin-dying bill introduced this year in the California Assembly, “This is a very serious issue…. It is
not up to me to substitute my moral views on you, and it’s not up to anyone else to substitute their
moral views on anyone else”;94 and former Vermont governor Phil Hoff, speaking in support of
the Vermont Death with Dignity Act of 2005 currently under consideration by the Vermont
legislature, “While I respect people making different choices for themselves, a small minority of
Vermonters should not be able to impose their views on the vast majority of Vermonters that
want more choice and control at the end of our lives.”95
Oregon is the only state to date that has enacted legislation (the 1998 Oregon Death with Dignity
law) protecting this natural individual right of freedom of choice in end-of-life decisions. All of
the current legislative efforts – the Oregon law as well as the proposed legislation in Vermont and
California – share several elements that must be met if a person is to self-hasten death in
accordance with law: “[(i)] a person must be a terminally ill adult, [(ii)] two doctors must agree
that the person is competent (either doctor may require psychological testing), [(iii)] the request
must be made three separate times and may be withdrawn at any time, and [(iv)] the person must
acquire the medication and the medication must be self-administered.”96
violate either the norms of faith, or the boundaries of prejudice under a particular set of circumstances in
the past, is it still appropriate for Christians to suggest that one cannot elect death for himself or herself
under a different set of circumstances in the present? It seems to me that a certain irrational inconsistency
is operating here, which needs to be pointed out to any faith community that espouses such claims.” Id. at
4.
And on the Christian view of death:
Let there be no mistake about what is happening. These stirring achievements [of technology
(such as ‘quadruple heart bypasses, chemo and radiation therapy, laparoscopic surgical procedures
and organ transplants, PSA tests and pap smears, miracle drugs and incredible life-support
systems’) expanding life expectancy] represent human beings taking on the power we once
ascribed only to God. We have by our own knowledge and expertise put our hands on the
decisions about life and death. We cannot now refuse to engage these decisions at the end of our
own lives. We have pushed back the boundaries of death inexorably. We have enabled this
generation to live in a way that previous generations could never have imagined. We have
watched human life actually evolve to where it must accept God-like responsibilities. The time
has come to celebrate that, not to hide from it in the language of piety.
“What I see the religious community doing today is to tremble in the face of our own human
audacity and to seek to hide from the responsibility inherent in our own human achievements,
none of which we would be willing to surrender. Why else would we hesitate before this final
boundary called death? Why would we resist so vigorously the reality that now we must take a
hand in our death decisions? When medical science expands the boundary and the quality of life,
Christians do not complain. We, rather, rejoice because we believe it affirms our conviction that
life is holy.
“It is one thing, however, to expand life and it is quite another to postpone death. When medical
science shifts from expanding the length and quality of life and begins simply to postpone the
reality of death, why are we not capable of saying that the sacredness of life is no longer being
served, and therefore Christians must learn to act responsibly in the final moments of life.”
Id. at 8-9.
94
Quoted in Compassion & Choices, Advocacy Bulletin Vol. II, Issue II (March 14, 2005). Available at
http://www.endoflifechoices.org/learn/index.jsp, visited April 8, 2005.
95
Compassion & Choices, Advocacy Bulletin Vol. II, Issue II (March 14, 2005). Available at
http://www.endoflifechoices.org/learn/index.jsp, visited April 8, 2005.
96
Frequently-Asked-Questions, available at http://www.endoflifechoices.org/learn/index.jsp, visited April
8, 2005. The Oregon Department of Human Services’ recent report on the seventh year statistics on the
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As reflected by these state efforts, end-of-life choice is one individual freedom of autonomy
interest a solid majority of the People apparently do support97 - perhaps because they recognize
that they themselves, rather than some nameless others, may desire to exercise the right at some
future date. Thus it is disappointing, though of course unsurprising and entirely consistent, that
Congress and the Bush administration would seek to remove this freedom and impose their own
set of moral views on others - and so have sued to have the Oregon law declared
unconstitutional.98 The government’s lawsuit seeking to remove an individual liberty previously
protected by state law is grossly inappropriate on two levels: one, for our immediate purposes, it
fails to protect individual freedom of autonomy on a matter of natural private concern; two, it
violates principles of comity in federal-state relations by interfering with the policy determination
of a sovereign state engaged in regulating, under its tenth amendment reservation of authority, a
matter reserved to state governments. Just another instance of overbearing federal interference
with individual autonomy and with state prerogative… this is why We the People need a
constitutional amendment protecting freedom of autonomy.
`
Soft Drugs For close to 400 years – from the time of the first American hemp crop in 1611 near
Jamestown, Virginia through the turn of the twentieth-century - marijuana (then known as hemp)
was grown in America for its fiber content. Indeed, “King James I of Britain ordered settlers to
engage in wide scale farming of the plant. Most of the sails and ropes on colonial ships were
made from hemp as were many of the colonists’ bibles, clothing and maps. [And in the most
delicious irony of all, a]ccording to some historians, George Washington and Thomas Jefferson
cultivated marijuana and advocated a hemp-based economy.”99
Fast forward to the twenty-first century, when use or possession of marijuana is illegal and
aggressively enforced (734,000 criminal arrests per year) and prosecuted by the federal and many
state governments, at a cost of anywhere from $7.5 - $10 billion per year. Aside from being
crazy policy (crazy or not, policy is ordinarily within the proper realm of a democratically-elected

law “show that 37 people ended their lives under the law in 2004, slightly fewer than in 2003. As required
by law, all were terminally ill and made repeated and voluntary requests for assistance.” Compassion &
Choices, Advocacy Bulletin Vol. II, Issue II (March 14, 2005). Available at
http://www.endoflifechoices.org/learn/index.jsp, visited April 8, 2005.
97
Seventy percent of respondents to a 2005 Field Poll in California “agreed that a mentally competent,
terminally ill adult should be able to receive aid from their doctor to die peacefully.” Compassion &
Choices, Advocacy Bulletin Vol. II, Issue II (March 14, 2005). Available at
http://www.endoflifechoices.org/learn/index.jsp, visited April 8, 2005 (citing www.caforaidindying.org).
In a recent poll conducted by Zogby International in Vermont, “[n]early 80 percent of respondents said they
would support a bill allowing terminally ill patients to receive medication from their doctors to hasten their
deaths.” Id. (citing www.choicesvermont.org). An Episcopalian convention of the Diocese of Newark,
consisting of 450 elected lay people and 150 ordained Episcopalian clergy, after a year of open hearings
“endorsed by a 2 to 1 majority … physician assisted suicide as a moral option for Christians.” John Shelby
Spong, Death: A Friend to be Welcomed Not an Enemy to be Defeated, An address to the national
Convention of the Hemlock Society in San Diego California, January 10, 2003. Available at
http://www.endoflifechoices.org/learn/index.jsp, visited April 8, 2005 (citing www.dioceseofnewark.org).
98
The Oregon law prevailed at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court has agreed to
hear the government’s appeal in Gonzales v. Oregon. The government argues that the federal Controlled
Substances Act authorizes the government to preempt state regulations allowing the use of such substances
in the end-of-life choice process. [cite]
99
NORML Report on Sixty Years of Marijuana Prohibition in the U.S., available online at
http://www.norml.com. Visited April 20, 2005. (citing ___).
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legislature),100 the government’s zeal in apprehending and punishing even minor offenders who
would use marijuana occasionally is just plain bizarre.101 The oddness started in the 1920s and in
1930 with the government’s establishment of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN). In
response to an FBN-sponsored campaign, reefer-madness hysteria took hold in the 1930s,
prompting 27 states to pass laws prohibiting marijuana. For example, “a news bulletin issued by
the FBN in the mid-1930s purported that a user of marijuana ‘becomes a fiend with savage or
‘cave-man’ tendencies. His sex desires are aroused and some of the most horrible crimes result.
He hears light and sees sound. To get away from it, he suddenly becomes violent and may
kill.’”102
The “Marihuana Tax Act of 1937,” criminalizing the possession or use of marijuana, was passed
after two Congressional hearings (one House, one Senate) totaling just one hour; after debate in
the House lasting 90 seconds, and with similar alacrity in the Senate. In the House Ways and
Means Committee hearing two witnesses, the head of the FBN and a Treasury Department
Assistant General Counsel, testified in favor of the bill; and a physician representative from the
American Medical Association (AMA) testified against. The committee took little interest in the
AMA’s views, however, telling the physician, “If you want to advise us on legislation, you ought
to come here with some constructive proposals … rather than trying to throw obstacles in the way
of something that the federal government is trying to do.” Adding insult to injury, during the 90
100

Objectively, there are numerous policy reasons to decriminalize marijuana: (1) cost of enforcement –
“taxpayers annually spend between $7.5 billion and $10 billion arresting and prosecuting individuals for
marijuana violations”; “police arrest more American per year on marijuana charges [approximately
734,000] than the total number of arrestees for all violent crime combined, including murder, rape, robbery
and aggravated assault”; (2) harm caused by criminal prohibition of marijuana is much greater than harm
caused by marijuana use itself – As former President Jimmy Carter said, “Penalties against drug use should
not be more damaging to an individual than the use of the drug itself. Nowhere is this more clear than in
the laws against the possession of marijuana in private for personal use”; “a 1982 National Academy of
Sciences report on marijuana reaffirmed that criminal justice approaches were inappropriate and harmful.
It recommended not only that marijuana possession be decriminalized, but that lawmakers give serious
consideration to creating a system of regulated distribution and sale”; (3) decriminalization does not lead
to increased marijuana use – “More than 30 percent of the U.S. population lives under some form of
marijuana decriminalization, and according to government and academic studies, these laws have not
contributed to an increase in marijuana consumption” (moreover, decriminalization appears to reduce rates
of hard drug use in states that have decriminalized); the state legislatures in twelve states (Alaska,
California, Colorado, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio
and Oregon) have enacted various forms of decriminalization where users no longer are subject to jail time
(or, in most cases, arrest or criminal records) for the possession or use of small amounts of marijuana; (4)
medical benefits – “Written references to the use of marijuana as a medicine as a medicine date back nearly
5,000 years. Western medicine embraced marijuana’s medical properties in the mid-1800s, and by the
beginning of the 20th century, physicians had published more than 100 papers in the Western medical
literature recommending its use for a variety of disorders.” Twelve states (Alaska, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont and Washington) have legalized
marijuana for medical use. http://www.norml.com/ (citing numerous sources), visited April 20, 2005.
101
A visitor to the planet would wonder why government cares so much about a little weed - indeed, if
legislatures stopped to think for even half a moment with some clarity on the issue, they would recognize
that another little weed, tobacco, has been a major contributor to state economies (as was hemp, see supra
text accompanying note __) from the earliest pre-Revolutionary days. Marijuana is no different than other
soft drugs like alcohol and tobacco. It may be similarly taxed and regulated. As with alcohol, for example,
it becomes a matter of public concern if I operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of marijuana,
since chances are increased that I may have an accident and cause physical harm or injury to another;
accordingly, government is justified in preventing me from mixing the activities.
102
NORML Report on Sixty Years of Marijuana Prohibition in the U.S., available online at
http://www.norml.com. Visited April 20, 2005 (citing _____)
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seconds of debate in the House, a member of the committee lied in response to a question103 of
whether the AMA supported the bill, stating, “Their Doctor … gave this measure his full support
… [as well as] the approval [of] the American Medical Association.”104
The point for our purposes is that the government’s prohibition of marijuana by any means
(including its current over-the-top approach) violates the individual right of freedom of autonomy
on matters of natural private concern.105 As James Madison wrote, speaking on behalf of a
founding generation overwhelming “focused on the effort to free the individual from the
oppressive misuse of power, from the tyranny of the state,”106 every person has a “[right] in the
free use of his faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ them.”107

Abortion If we accept for a moment (for purpose of argument only) that life – with its full set of
intact constitutional protections - begins at conception,108 abortion presents the especially hard
case where one person’s exercise of individual freedom of autonomy not only interferes with the
autonomy rights of another, but actually causes an absolute deprivation of the other’s rights – the
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The only other question asked for a summary of the bill, to which Speaker Sam Rayburn replied, “I
don’t know. It has something to do with a thing called marijuana. I think it’s a narcotic of some kind.”
NORML Report on Sixty Years of Marijuana Prohibition in the U.S., available online at
http://www.norml.com. Visited April 20, 2005 (citing _____)
104
NORML Report on Sixty Years of Marijuana Prohibition in the U.S., available online at
http://www.norml.com. Visited April 20, 2005. (citing ___)
105
Any “actionable” harm or injury caused by a person using marijuana is to that individual alone, no one
else. As with tobacco and alcohol there is an expense to society in the form of healthcare cost and some
loss of productivity, but these are costs of freedom – much as military spending is a cost of freedom. And
of course society can attempt to reduce or make up for these costs through various means, not the least of
which would be the cost savings from freeing thousands of incarcerated drug “offenders.”
What about hard drugs like heroin, crack cocaine, etc.? The freedom of autonomy principle discussed in
this essay is open to (but still isn’t entirely convinced by) the argument that there is a point at which the use
and possession of those items is so demonstrably harmful to society as a whole that government may
legitimately prohibit them, in which case the means of dealing with the issue - whether through
punishment, treatment, etc. – is a policy matter for the elected legislative body. On the other hand, whereas
governments everywhere have erred on the side of paternalism even with marijuana (with notable
exceptions like The Netherlands and, more recently, Canada) the freedom of autonomy principle is also
open to – and on balance favors - the argument that hard drugs, though demonstrably harmful, are harmful
to the using individual - not others, so they should not be prohibited. They may be heavily regulated and
controlled under this argument - but not prohibited. Government paternalism is not the answer – rather,
education on health dangers, moral approbation and parental and family influence should prevent the mast
majority people from using the drugs.
This second argument has several advantages over the first: (1) it need not be concerned with the
supremely difficult task in differentiating those substances so harmful as to be absolutely prohibited from
those that are not; (2) it allows more creative approaches to dealing with the problems created by the use of
drugs, not the least of which is the violence associated with trafficking; (3) it adheres to the guiding
principle of resolving questions on the boundary or any close calls in favor of the individual freedom of
autonomy, instead of in favor of government prohibition.
106
BAILYN, supra note 6, at v-vi.
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Levy, supra note 3, at 252-53. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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The contemporary arguments over abortion are well-documented, and we will not re-visit them here.
At the core of the debate is a seemingly intractable disagreement: one side says life begins at conception;
the other says it begins at birth (or perhaps viability), and never the twain shall meet. Each side is
passionate in its views; neither hears what the other is saying - both talk past one another.
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classic zero-sum game. Moreover, abortion is the hardest case of all because a choice must be
made – indeed, a woman’s postponing or avoiding action is itself an affirmative choice.
For our purposes the question is who will make this decision? Will it be the government as proxy
for the nascent life? Or rather will the woman be free to make this most difficult of decisions on
her own behalf?
Applying freedom of autonomy principles, the answer is not automatic. To the extent that by
prohibiting abortion the government is acting to protect the right of the zygote, embryo or fetus109
to be left alone on a matter of natural private concern (to live), it is acting legitimately. On the
other hand, prohibiting abortion certainly does not leave a woman alone on a matter of private
concern, and thus violates her individual freedom of autonomy.
But this assumes that fully-protected life begins at conception – an assumption that a rational
approach simply cannot make. The rights of a zygote, embryo or early fetus cannot be equated
with those of a late-term fetus or an infant – the latter possess some measure of human
consciousness,110 whereas a zygote, embryo or early fetus does not. The woman’s freedom of
autonomy must prevail at this early stage. When the fetus achieves viability – where it can
survive on its own independently of the mother - the equation shifts. For freedom of autonomy
purposes the fetus is a person at the point of viability, and the state is justified in prohibiting
abortion to protect that person’s right to be left alone to live, subject to the usual exceptions for
mother’s health and other extenuating circumstances.
This is the proper approach. For a solid five-plus months, before the fetus reaches viability, the
woman’s choice prevails. From viability onward, the fetus-person’s choice, as enabled by
government, prevails (subject to exceptions). The woman has a choice; once that choice is made
she bears a responsibility. On this score, the Supreme Court has done an effective job of
attempting to strike a reasoned balance between the competing interests by developing exactly
this framework – before viability, government may not impose an “undue burden” on a woman’s
ability to have an abortion; after viability, the government is justified in restricting abortion,
subject to exceptions.111
Jed Rubenfeld offers as incisive a description as any on the inappropriateness of outright
government prohibition of abortion: “It is impossible to name a single prohibitory law in our
legal system with greater affirmative, [indeed] conscriptive, life-occupying effects than those
imposed by a law forcing a woman to bear a child against her will. [‘It compels this woman to
bear a child. It forces motherhood upon her.’] This woman is physically taken over for a purpose
dictated to her by the state, and this taking-over can be expected to last not merely nine months,
but for many years thereafter – indeed, for a lifetime. Her body, her mind, and her time will be
substantially occupied by the task that the state has forced upon her. She has been
instrumentalized, impressed into state-dictated service. It is no exaggeration to say that a law
forcing women to be mothers is a totalitarian intrusion into their lives.”112
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A zygote is the “cell formed [at conception] by the union of two gametes”; an embryo is a “human
organism in the first eight weeks from conception”; a fetus is “a human embryo of eight weeks or more.”
The American Century Dictionary, Warner Books Paperback Edition (Oxford 1995).
110
“Consciousness” may be determined by measuring, for example, brain function or pain response.
111
Casey v. Pennsylvania, __ U.S. __ (1992). An “undue burden” is defined as a government action that
places a “substantial obstacle” in the way of the woman in her efforts to get an abortion.
112
Jed Rubenfeld, supra note 61, at 225-26.
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Religion The freedom of autonomy amendment would also reinforce other fundamental rights,
some of which receive short shrift from the judiciary. For example, although the first amendment
guarantees the free exercise of religion, the Supreme Court currently allows government to
prohibit free exercise with neutral, generally applicable laws that meet the less rigorous
intermediate-scrutiny standard of review. Under the freedom of autonomy approach, free
exercise may be subject to reasonable content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions, but
they may not be prohibited outright except in the most exceptional cases in which the government
overcomes the heavy presumption of invalidity and satisfies strict scrutiny standard of review.113
The Court’s intermediate-scrutiny standard for generally applicable, neutral laws affecting free
exercise was enunciated in Smith v. Oregon114 in 1990. Smith led to Congress’s passage of the
1994 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), specifying “[any generally applicable, neutral
law affecting the free exercise of religion shall be subject to strict scrutiny in the courts].”115 In
1997, the Court in turn struck down RFRA as beyond Congress’s scope of authority in City of
Boerne,116 stating that the Act, by telling the Court what standard of review to use in a particular
case went beyond the mere enforcement of existing rights and instead created new substantive
rights not given in the fourteenth amendment.
For our purposes, the Court misses the boat in Smith and Boerne. Freedom of autonomy
principles recognize the legitimate role of government in applying, under firm guidelines,
reasonable content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions on individual liberty of free choice
on matters of natural private concern,117 but require that any outright prohibition carry a heavy
presumption of invalidity and must satisfy strict scrutiny review to survive.118 The Court does not
distinguish in Smith and Boerne between government restrictions and prohibitions – it simply
applies a blanket rule that any generally applicable, neutral rule gets intermediate scrutiny
regardless of its prohibitory effect on free exercise. In Smith, the underlying neutral, generally
applicable law created an outright prohibition on one’s free exercise of religion, so it should have
been strictly scrutinized; whereas the underlying neutral, generally applicable zoning decision by
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See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
__U.S. __ (1990). Smith, a Native American who was denied unemployment benefits from the state
after being convicted for violating a state law prohibiting the use of hallucinogenic drugs, claimed that
resulting denial of benefits constituted a violation of his free exercise rights. The Court upheld Smith’s
conviction.
115
__ U.S.C. __ (1994). Smith and RFRA represent something of an ironic role-reversal, with the Court
taking a less protective view of a freedom of autonomy right than Congress – here Congress seeks to
protect the free exercise of religion from government interference (ironically still, it is an Act of Congress
itself – i.e., punishing the use of soft drugs – that constitutes the government interference), and it is the
Court that is less protective of the right. Congress thereafter amended its law to include an exception for
use of peyote by Native Americans in tribal rituals. American Indian Religious Freedom Amendments Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-344, 108 Stat. 3125 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (2000)).
116
__ U.S. __, __ (1997). In Boerne, parishioners of a Catholic Church claimed that a municipality’s
denial of the Church’s application for a zoning variance to build an addition onto its facilities constituted a
violation of their free exercise rights.
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See supra notes 54-58, 77 and accompanying text, discussing the Court’s analogous speech doctrine
which allows the limiting regulations only if they offer reasonable content- neutral time, place or manner
alternatives. These legitimate restrictions, of which there are many examples, are less objectionable
precisely because they are limits, not outright prohibitions. The limits on free exercise, by contrast, offer
no such alternative – Smith was prohibited outright from practicing his religion free of government
recrimination.
118
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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the city of Boerne in applying its local ordinance merely placed a restriction on the church,119 so
was properly reviewed under intermediate scrutiny.
On structural separation of powers grounds, Boerne was correctly decided. The Court was
justified in holding that Congress exceeded its fourteenth amendment section 5 powers in
attempting to dictate to the Court how it will exercise its power of judicial review. Congress
cannot tell the judiciary substantively how to adjudicate cases, whereas the Constitution can.
And that’s exactly what the freedom of autonomy amendment would do, and why it is necessary it would provide guidance, in the Constitution, to the Court on the preeminence it should place on
the protection of individual freedom of autonomy on matters of natural private concern.120

C.

Foundations

To appreciate the American colonists’ view of individual liberty, one must understand their own
sense of history. They had come recently out of oppressive circumstances of government tyranny
and had a visceral understanding of the dangers posed to individual liberty by unrestrained
government.121 Their native land, England, through the centuries had endured “alternating
episodes of royal despotism and commoner anarchy infringing upon liberty,” with liberty most
recently only narrowly “emerg[ing] from its trials intact… [in what] had been a close victory
which would require the utmost vigilance to maintain.”122 Elsewhere in the world, liberty had
been lost.123
119

The city’s denial of the zoning variance was a non-neutral “place” restriction. Whether it was a
reasonable non-neutral time, place or manner restriction is another matter – maybe it was, maybe it wasn’t,
but that’s a separate question.
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The first amendment establishment clause, the structural support holding up Jefferson’s strict wall of
separation between church and state (so important in protecting government from the influence of any
particular religion, and also, as one colleague, Frank Ravitch, puts it, in “protecting my religion from
government”), is under siege as well. As of Spring 2005, the question of whether government may impose
the majority’s religious viewpoint on all citizens by allowing placement of religious paraphernalia on
government property hangs in the balance of one or two votes on the Supreme Court. As of the date of this
writing, the United States Supreme Court had not yet decided The Ten Commandments Cases, but its
decision on whether government’s placement of the Ten Commandments on government property
constitutes an unconstitutional establishment or promotion of the Christian religion likely will depend on
the vote of just one or perhaps two Supreme Court Justices. (For the record I’m going out on a limb and
predicting the Court will uphold the lower court and ban placement of 10 Commandments on government
property by a bare 5-4 or 6-3 margin. Of course, the Court may uphold the lower court by a wider margin
in this case (it’s highly unlikely to be struck down, if at all, by a margin wider than 5-4), in which case I
will be delighted to eat my words.) Incidentally, government continues to be unfazed by the fact that such
displays are of questionable constitutionality – witness the Michigan House of Representative Committee
on Government Operations’ 5-3 vote on March 23, 2005 to place the Ten Commandments on display in the
Michigan State Capitol building.
121
See generally, Levy, supra note 3; Bailyn, supra note 6.
122
Bailyn, supra note 6, at 79, 81[citing, e.g., Otis, Right of the British Colonies (JHL 17). In the minds of
the colonists, among the primary reasons liberty was able to prevail in Britain was that “[g]radually
safeguards against such evils [threatening liberty] were built up – that great array of documents starting
with Magna Carta that outlined the inner boundaries of English liberties – which remained effective until,
in the seventeenth century, that ‘execrable race of the Stuarts’ precipitated a ‘formidable, violent, and
bloody’ struggle between the people and the confederacy ‘of temporal and spiritual tyranny.’ In the end
liberty, as all the world knew, had been re-established in England….” Bailyn, supra note 6, at 81 (citing
and quoting, e.g., James Otis, Rights of the British Colonies (JHL 7), p.31; Bland, Inquiry (JHL 17), pp. 78; Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, August 13, 1776, papers of Thomas Jefferson (Julian P. Boyd, ed.,
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“It had been at this critical juncture in the history of England and of liberty,” Bailyn writes, “that
America had been settled. The conjunction had not been accidental. ‘It was this great struggle
that peopled America … a love of universal liberty, and a hatred, a dread, a horror, of the infernal
confederacy [of temporal and spiritual tyranny] projected, conducted, and accomplished the
settlement of America.’ The colonists’ conception of threats to liberty throughout recent history
therefore ‘was a matter of great importance … not merely because it illustrated the characteristic
dangers liberty faced but also because it made clear their own special role in history.’”124
Revolutionary-era Americans themselves were aware that a fortuitous confluence of events had
placed them at a unique crossroads in history, to the point where by 1776 “Americans had come
to think of themselves as in a special category, uniquely placed by history to capitalize on, to
complete and fulfill, the promise of man’s existence….”125 As John Adams put it in 17__, “The
liberties of mankind and the glory of human nature is in their keeping…. America was designed
by Providence for the theatre on which man was to make his true figure, on which science, virtue,
liberty, happiness, and glory were to exist in peace.”126
The view of America as a kind of unique Petri dish in time was shared by others outside of the
colonies as well: “European illuminati continued to identify America, as John Locke had done,
with something approximating a benign state of nature and to think of the colonies as special
preserves of virtue and liberty…. No less a figure than Voltaire stated [in 173_] that America
was the refinement of all that was good in England, writing in his Lettres philosophiques that
Penn and the Quakers had actually brought into existence ‘that golden age of which men talk so
much and which probably has never existed anywhere except in Pennsylvania.’”127

Princeton, 1950-), I, 492; Hicks, Consideration (JHL 18) p. 2; [James Wilson], Considerations on the …
Authority of the British Parliament (Philadelphia, 1774: JHL Pamphlet 44), p.12; Adams, Dissertation, in
Works, III, 451).
123
Bailyn, supra note 6, at 79-80 (stating that “only in Britain had the battle repeatedly been won”): “The
colonists … looked ahead with anxiety rather than with confidence, for they knew, from the whole of their
received tradition, of the desperate plight of liberty everywhere: ‘new tyrannies have sprung up, like so
many new plagues, within the memory of man, and … [have] engrossed almost the whole earth,’ rendering
‘the world a slaughterhouse.’ Rulers of the East were ‘almost universally absolute tyrants … The states of
Africa are scenes of tyranny, barbarity, confusion, and every form of violence. And even in Europe,…
[France] has an arbitrary authority…; [Prussia,] an absolute government …; [Sweden and Denmark] have
sold or betrayed their liberties …; [Rome] groans under a medley of civil and ecclesiastical bondage…;
[Germany] is a hundred-headed hydra…; [and Poland a ruin of] extravagant licentiousness and anarchy …
the nobility and gentry arbitrary despotic tyrants, and the populace a race of slaves.’ … [O]nly in Britain
had the battle repeatedly been won. Yet even in Britain the margin of victory had been narrow, especially
in the last, bitter struggle with sould-be despots of the house of Stuart. And the dangers were known to
persist.” Id. at 79-80 (citing “Cato’s Letters, no. 73; New York Gazette: or, The Weekly Post Boy,
November 1, 1756, quoting at length ‘a survey of the kingdoms of the earth’ that appeared in the eleventh
essay by ‘Virginia-Centinel,’ originally published in the Virginia Gazette in September or October,
1756….”; see also New York Mercury, May 22, 1758.).
124
Bailyn, supra note 6, at 80. “[T]he settlers of America had emigrated to create in a new land civil and
ecclesiastical governments purer, freer than those they had left behind. The transplantation had been made
from an undefiled branch of the nation, strong, healthy, brimming with the juices of liberty, and it had been
placed in a soil perfect for its growth [-] [i]n the colonies, ‘sought and settled as an asylum for liberty, civil
and religious’…” Id. [at 80 or 20]
125
Bailyn, supra note 6, at 20.
126
Id. (quoting John Adams, Diary and Autobiography, I, 282).
127
Bailyn, supra note 6, at 83-84.
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“Over a period of a century and a half [before the founding], America became accustomed to the
idea that government existed by consent of the governed, that the people created the government,
that they did so by written compact, that the compact reserved their natural rights, and that it
constituted a fundamental law to which the government was subordinate. Constitutionalism, or
the theory of limited government, was in part an outgrowth of [this] social compact.”128
A half-century before John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government, Thomas Hooker of
Connecticut expounded the social compact theory, and one hundred years before the Declaration
of Independence, the Pennsylvania “Charter of Fundamental Laws of West New Jersey (1677),
which was probably the work of William Penn … began with the provision that the ‘common law
or fundamental rights’ of the colon[ists] should be ‘the foundation of the government, which is
not to be altered by the Legislative authority.”129 This was a significant expansion over the
protections offered in Mother England, where the “liberty documents … limited only the crown,
not the legislature.”
"The Virginia constitution of 1776, the first permanent state constitution, began with a
Declaration of Rights that restrained all branches of government…. [and further specified that]
‘all men’ are equally free and have inherent rights that cannot be divested even by compact; that
among these rights are the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property and the pursuit of happiness;
and that all power derives from the people, who retain a right to change the government if it fails
to secure its objectives.”130
The political philosophy of the pre-Revolutionary and Revolutionary generations comes through
clearly in their writing,131 which itself was influenced by a wide range of written sources, from
the ancients,132 the European Enlightenment,133 to English common lawyers,134 to covenant
128

Levy, supra note 3, at 3-4. “Through their first-hand observation of how ‘Parliament had irrevocably
limited itself [in order to protect individual liberties] by reaffirmations of the Magna Carta and passage of
the Petition of Right of 1628, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, the Bill of Rights of 1689, and the Toleration
Act of 1689[,] Americans learned that a free people are those who live under a government so
constitutionally checked and controlled that its powers must be reasonably exercised without abridging
individual rights.’” Id. at 4-5.
129
Id. at 3, 7.
130
Id. at 7.
131
“[T]he leaders of the American Revolution… turned out … a rich literature of theory, argument,
opinion and polemic. Every medium of written expression was put to use. The newspapers… were
crowded with columns of arguments and counter-arguments appearing as letters, official documents,
extracts of speeches, and sermons. Broadsides – single sheets … - appeared everywhere; they could be
found posted or passing from hand to hand in the towns of every colony. Almanacs … universally
available in the colonies, carried … a considerable freight of political comment. Above all, there were
pamphlets: booklets consisting of a few printer’s sheets, folded in various ways so as to make various sizes
and numbers of pages, and sold – the pages stitched together loosely, unbound and uncovered….” Bailyn,
supra note 6, at 1-2 (citing Arthur M. Schlesinger, Prelude to Independence (New York, 1958), pp. 215226, part ii; Philip Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, 1941), pp. 216-224).
“Explanatory as well as declarative, and expressive of the beliefs, attitudes, and motivations as well as the
professed goals of those who led and supported the Revolution, the pamphlets are the distinctive literature
of the Revolution. They reveal, more clearly than any other single group of document, the contemporary
meaning of that transforming event.” Id. at 8.
132
“Among the most conspicuous, but often somewhat superficial, sources, were the classical authors such
as Homer, Sophocles, Plato, Euripides, Herodotus, etc., etc…. “’It was an obscure pamphleteer indeed who
could not muster at least one classical analogy or one ancient precept.’” Bailyn, supra note __ at 24,
quoting Charles F. Mullett, “Classical Influences on the American Revolution,” Classical Journal 35 (193940), 93, 94.] Of the classics, “above all Cicero, Sallust, and Tacitus – writers who had lived either when
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theology,135 but “important as all of these clusters of ideas were, they did not in themselves form
a coherent intellectual pattern.”136 “What brought these disparate strands of thought together,
what dominated the colonists’ miscellaneous learning and shaped it into a coherent whole, was
the influence of … the writings of a group of seventeenth century English opposition theorists.”137

the republic was being fundamentally challenged or when its greatest days were already past and its moral
and political virtues decayed…. For the colonists, arguing the American cause in the controversies of the
1760s and 1770s, the analogies to their own times were compelling…. The classics of the ancient world
are everywhere in the literature of the Revolution, but they are everywhere illustrative, not determinative,
of thought.” Id. at 25-26.
133
“More directly influential in shaping the thought of the Revolutionary generation were the ideas and
attitudes associated with the writings of Enlightenment rationalism – writings that expressed not simply the
rationalism of liberal reform but that of enlightened conservatism as well…. The ideas and writings of the
leading secular thinkers of the European Enlightenment – reformers and social critics like Voltaire,
Rousseau, and Beccaria as well as conservative analysts like Montesquieu – were quoted everywhere in the
colonies, by everyone who claimed a broad awareness. … Alexander Hamilton, for example, seeking to
score points against his venerable antagonist, Samuel Seabury, recommended with arch condescension that
his adversary get himself at the first opportunity to some of the writings of Pufendorf, Locke, Montesquieu,
and Bulamaqui to discover the true principles of politics.” Bailyn, supra note 6, at 26-28. All of that said,
“the knowledge they reflect, like that of the ancient classics, is at times superficial…[; moreover,
e]veryone, whatever his position on Independence or his judgment of Parliament’s actions, cited them as
authoritative; almost no one, Whig or Tory, disputed them or introduced them with apology…. [E]xcept
for Locke’s, their influence, though more decisive than that of the authors of classical antiquity, was neither
clearly dominant nor wholly determinative.” Id. at 30-31.
134
“Also prominent and in certain ways powerfully influential was yet another group of writers and ideas
… - the great figures of England’s legal history, especially the seventeenth-century common lawyers” like
Sir Edward Coke; Lord Chief Justices Francis Bacon, Sir Matthew Hale, Sir John Vaughan, and Sir John
Holt; and William Blackstone. “The common law was manifestly influential in shaping the awareness
[and serving as a repository of history and human dealings] of the Revolutionary generation – … [indeed,
it] stood side by side with Enlightenment rationalism in [their] minds.” “But again, it did not in itself
determine the kinds of conclusions men would draw in the crisis of the time.” Id., at 30-31.
135
America as Providence. Another “major source of ideas and attitudes of the Revolutionary generation
stemmed ultimately from the political and social theories of New England Puritanism, and particularly from
the ideas associate with covenant theology. In one sense this was the most limited and parochial tradition
…, [in that it was] restricted in its appeal to those who continued to understand the world, as the original
Puritans had, in theological terms. But in another[, ironic] sense it contained the broadest ideas of all, since
it offered a context for everyday events nothing less than cosmic in its dimensions…. [It was] found
everywhere in the idea that America had a special place, as yet not fully revealed, in the architecture of
God’s intent.” Id. at 32-33.
136
“There were among them, in fact, striking incongruities and contradictions. The English common
lawyers the colonists cited, for example, sought to establish right by appeal to precedent and to an unbroken
tradition evolving form time immemorial, and they assumed … inherited custom contained within it a
greater wisdom than any man or group of men could devise by the power of reason. Nothing could have
been more alien to the Enlightenment rationalists whom the colonists also quoted – and with equal
enthusiasm. These theorists felt that it was precisely the heavy crust of custom that was weighing down the
spirit of man; they sought to throw it off and to create by the unfettered power of reason a framework of
institutions superior to the accidental inheritance of the past.” Id. at 33-34.
137
Prolific writers, these “‘country’ politicians and publicists… [were] united in criticism of ‘court’ and
ministerial power,” … [and included among their numbers] John Milton, author of Eikonolastes and The
Tenure of Kings and Magistrates (both 1649) …; the like-minded Henry Neville; and, above all, … the
doctrines of Algernon Sidney, that ‘martyr to civil liberty,’ whose Discourses Concerning Government
(1698) became, in Caroline Robbins’ phrase, a ‘textbook of revolution’ in America. [cites omitted].” Id. at
34-35.
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A group of early eighteenth-century writers then “modified and enlarged this earlier body of
ideas, fused it into a whole with other contemporary strains of thought, and, above all, applied it
to the problems of eighteenth century English politics. These eighteenth-century writers –
coffeehouse radicals and opposition politicians, spokesmen for the anti-Court independents
within Parliament and the disaffected without … faded subsequently into obscurity and are little
known today. But more than any other single group of writers they shaped the mind of the
American Revolutionary generation.”138
“To the colonists the most important of these publicists and intellectual middlemen were those
spokesmen for extreme libertarianism, John Trenchard (1662-1723) and Thomas Gordon
(d.1750).”139 Together with the treatises of John Locke,140 the writings of Trenchard and Gordon
138

Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 34-35. Trenchard and Gordon “joined forces to produce, first, the weekly Independent Whig to
attack High Church pretensions and, more generally, the establishment of religion, fifty-three papers of
which were published in book form in 1721; and Cato’s Letters, a searing indictment of eighteenth-century
English politics and society… which appeared first serially in The London Journal and the, beginning in
1720, in book form. [cites omitted] … [T]hese libertarian tracts … left an indelible imprint on the
‘country’ mind everywhere in the English-speaking world. In America, they were republished entire or in
part again and again, ‘quoted in every colonial newspaper from Boston to Savannah,’ and referred to
repeatedly in the pamphlet literature.” Id.
The ideas forwarded by Trenchard and Gordon – ideas “based on extreme solicitude for the individual and
an equal hostility to government, were expressed in a spirit of foreboding and fear for the future…. [They]
grounded their thought in pessimism concerning human nature and in the discouraging record of human
weakness…. [Government corruption] was their major theme, their obsessive concern, and they hammered
away at it week after week, year after year…. So “Cato” warned, again and again, that ‘public corruptions
and abuses have grown upon us; fees in most, if not all, offices, are immensely increased; places and
employments, which ought not to be sold at all, are sold for treble value; the necessities of the public have
made greater impositions unavoidable, and yet the public has run very much in debt; and as those debts
have been increasing, and the people growing poor, salaries have been augmented, and pensions
multiplied.’ Id. at 48-50 (quoting Cato’s Letters no. 20, March 11, 1720 (in the London, 1748 ed., I 140.
See also, e.g., no. 17, February 18, 1720 (“What Measures Are Actually Taken by Wicked and Desperate
Ministers to Ruin and Enslave Their Country”), and no. 98, October 13, 1722.).
140
“In Locke’s formulation, natural law dictates that man is subject to divine imperatives to live in certain
ways, but, within the limits set by the law of nature, men can act in a godlike fashion. Man as maker has a
maker’s knowledge of his intentional actions, and a natural right to dominion over man’s products.
Provided we do not violate natural law, we stand in the same relation to the objects we create as God stands
to us; we own them just as he owns us.” Id. (citing John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, Book II, Chapter 27 and Book I, Chapter 30; also citing James Tully, A Discourse on
Property: John Locke and His Adversaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) pp. 108-10,
121); see also Levy, supra note 3, at 3, 7 (stating that for the founders, “the predominance of [Lockean]
social compact theory reflected a condition of freedom and, like the experience with charters, contributed to
the belief in written bills of rights.”). Shapiro sums up, “Natural law, or God’s natural right, thus sets outer
boundaries to a field within which humans have divine authority to act as miniature gods, creating rights
and obligations of their own…. [Locke, together with Hobbes,] believed that people are free to act as they
choose when natural law is silent, but, when it is not, neither was entirely comfortable with the proposition
that free human will must always succumb to natural law’s requirements. This was so despite the fact that
both of them believed natural law had the full force of both science and theology behind it…. Although
Locke thought natural law as expressed in the Scriptures binding on human beings, he recognized that the
Scriptures are sufficiently ambiguous to allow room for interpretive disagreement. … Locke insist[ed] that
God speaks directly to every individual who reads the Scriptures, and that no human authority is entitled to
declare one interpretation authoritative in the face of a conflicting one. This freedom to comprehend
natural law by one’s own lights supplied the basis of Locke’s right to resist that could be invoked against
the sovereign, and to which he himself appealed when opposing the English crown during the 1680s. His
139
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“ranked [to the colonists] … as the most authoritative statement of the nature of political liberty
and above Locke as an exposition of the social sources of the threats it faced.”141 “Standing with
Trenchard and Gordon as early eighteenth-century ‘preceptors of liberty’ was the liberal Anglican
bishop, Benjamin Hoadly[, the] ‘best hated clergyman of the century amongst his own order,’ …
[who] was widely held to be one of the notable figures in the history of political thought.”142
In short, “[o]pposition thought, in the form it acquired at the turn of the seventeenth century and
in the early eighteenth century, was devoured by the colonists. From the earliest years of the
century it nourished their political thought and sensibilities…. By 1728, in fact, Cato’s Letters
had already been fused with Locke, Coke, Pufendorf, and Grotius to produce a prototypical
American treatise in defense of English liberties overseas, a tract indistinguishable from any
number of publications that would appear in the Revolutionary crisis fifty years later.”143
“Testimonies to the unique influence of this opposition literature … are everywhere in the
writings of eighteenth-century America.”144 “Above all, their influence may be seen in the way
conviction that right answers can be discovered about the meaning of the Scriptures, and, hence, what
natural law requires, was not understood to obliterate human freedom to disagreed even about that very
subject.” Shapiro, supra note 18, at 16-17 (citing John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (London:
Allen & Unwin, 1986), Chapter 3; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Pelican Books, 1968 [1651]), p.
83).
141
Bailyn, supra note 6, at 34-35.
142
“For illustrations of the way Hoadly’s ideas entered into the mainstream of American Revolutionary
thought, see Jonathan Mayhew’s Discourse Concerning Unlimited Submission (Boston, 1750: JHL
Pamphlet 1)… Similarly, an anonymous English writer at the end of the century attributed the origins of the
French Revolution to the fact that ‘every class of Frenchman … became familiarly acquainted with Sidney,
Locke, and Hoadly.’ An Historical View of the French Revolution … 18 (Newcastle upon Tyne, 1796).”
Bailyn, supra note 37-43. “With Hoadly, among his contemporaries, though below him in importance to
the Americans, was the outstanding opponent in Parliament of [Robert] Walpole’s administration, the
leader of a coterie of early eighteenth-century freethinking Whigs, Robert Viscount Molesworth, Friend of
Trenchard and Gordon, encomiast of Cato’s Letters (they were frequently attributed to him), he was know
particularly in the colonies for his Account of Denmark (1694), which detailed the process by which free
states succumb to absolutism. [cites omitted] An opposition leader of another sort who contributed in a
more complicated way to the colonists’ inheritance of early eighteenth-century thought as the spectacular
jacobite politician, writer, and philosopher, Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke. His Craftsman,
appearing weekly or semiweekly for a full ten years, from 1726 to 1736, roasted Walpole’s administration
in crackling fires of ridicule and denunciation…. and decried the corruption of the age and warned of the
dangers of incipient autocracy. [cites omitted].” Others of this generation “the colonists knew and cited in
the same general context [include] … that extraordinary one-man propaganda machine in the cause of
liberty, the indefatigable Thomas Hollis, whose correspondence in the 1760s first with Mayhew and then
with Andrew Eliot illustrates vividly the directness of the influence of this radical and opposition tradition
on the ideological origins of the Revolution. In the Revolutionary years proper…, Richard Price Joseph
Priestley, and John Cartwright [were foremost]; but the key book of this generation was the three-volume
Political Disquisitions published in 1774 by the schoolmaster, political theorist, and moralist, James Burgh.
…. [A]mong the many Whig historians the Americans knew and referred to … their preference was for the
exiled Huguenot, Paul de Rapin-Thoyras, … [whose works,] published in England between 17[17] and
1731, … provided indisputable proof of the theories of all of the radical and anti-establshment writers by
demonstrating their validity through a thousand years of English history.” Gordon was also a very effective
translator of Sallust and Tacitus – “Under [Gordon’s] hands [Tacitus] virtually became an apologist for
English Whiggery.” Bailyn, supra note 6, at 41-42.
143
Id. at 43 (citing Dulany, Daniel, Sr., The Right of the Inhabitants of Maryland to the Benefit of the
English Laws, (Annapolis, 1728: reprinted in St. George L. Sioussat, The English Statutes in Maryland,
Baltimore, 1903)).
144
Id. at 44-45. “Sometimes they are explicit, as when Jonathan Mayhew wrote that, having been
‘initiated, in youth, in the doctrines of civil liberty, as they were taught by such men … as Sidney and
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the peculiar bent of mind of the writers in this tradition was reflected in the ideas and attitudes of
the Americans. … Their key concepts – natural rights, the contractual basis of society and
government, the uniqueness of England’s liberty-preserving ‘mixed’ constitution – were
commonplaces of the liberal thought of the time.”145 But if the elements of their thought were
ordinary, the emphasis placed upon them and the use made of them were not.”146
Revolutionary-era lawyer John Dickinson epitomized these commonly-held views of the day,
writing: “‘Natural rights’ are created in us by the decrees of Providence, which establish the laws
of our nature. They are born with us; exist with us; and cannot be taken from us by any human
power without taking our lives. In short, they are founded on the immutable maxims of reason
and justice…. The natural personal rights of individuals are … the very basis of all municipal
laws of any great value. [Indeed,] Magna Carta itself is in substance but a constrained
declaration, or proclamation and promulgation in the name of King, Lords, and Commons of the
sense the latter had of their original, inherent, indefeasible, natural rights.”147
The mere seven decades between the birth of the federal constitutional democracy in 1789 and
the onset of the Civil War in 1861 saw a sea-change in attitude regarding the nature of the threat
that government presented to individual liberty. As noted by Professor Amar, in the 1780s the
states were regarded as benign; indeed, they were regarded as protectors against a threatening
national government.148 As we have seen, “[i]n light of their experience with imperial arrogance
and oppression on the one hand, and the heroic roles played by local governments in resisting
oppression on the other, many Americans in the 1780s associated strong central government with
tyranny and a strong state government with freedom.”149 But after the turn of the century, “it
would be hard to argue that the central government acted qualitatively more repressively than

Milton, Locke, and Hoadly, among the moderns, I liked them; they seemed rational’; or when John Adams
insisted, against what he took to be the massed opinion of informed Englishmen, that the root principles of
good government could be found only in ‘Sidney, Harringon, Locke, Milton, Nedham, Nevill, Burnet, and
Hoadly’; or again, when he listed the great political thinkers of 1688 as ‘Sidney, Locie, Hoadly, Trenchard,
Gordon, Plato Redivivus (Neville]’… More often, the evidence is implicit, in the degree to which the
pamphleteers quoted from, plagiarized, and modeled their writings on Cato’s Letters and The Independent
Whig.” Id.
145
Id. at 49.
146
Id. at 44-45. For example, “John Adams professed to have read through five times [Bolingbroke’s
Freeholder’s Political Catechism (1733)]”. Id. at 39 n.22.
147
Id. at 77-78 (quoting [John Dickinson], An Address to the Committee of Correspondence in Barbadot
… (Philadelphia, 1766), in Paul L. Ford, ed., The Writings of John Dickinson (Memoirs of the Historical
Society of Pennsylvania, XIV, Philadelphia, 1895), p.262). See also Levy, supra note 3, at 3. Bailyn notes
that Dickinson reflects the prevailing view among the colonists was that “[s]uch God-given, natural,
inalienable rights, distilled from reason and justice through the social and governmental compacts, were
expressed in the common law of England, in the statutory instruments of Parliament, and in the charters of
privileges promulgated by the crown….” Id. at 77-78.
148
Amar, supra note 8, at 159 (citing Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 17761787, at 24-25, 60-61, 362 (1969); Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 104
(1991); citing also Del. Declaration of Rights of 1776, art. 6 (“the right of the people to participate in the
Legislature, is the foundation of liberty and of all free government”); Md. Const. Of 1776 (Declaration of
Rights), art. V (similar)).
149
Amar, supra note 8, at 158. “The American Revolution had featured local colonies fighting an imperial
center in the name of both freedom and federalism.” Id. “This association was of course strengthened by
the events of the following decade, with the Virginia and Kentucky legislatures (ghostwritten by Madison
and Jefferson, respectively) leading the charge against the federal Sedition Act.”
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local ones.”150 “The structural imperatives of the peculiar institution [of slavery] led slave states
to violate virtually every right and freedom declared in the Bill – not just the rights and freedoms
of slaves, but of free men and women too.”151
Add to the slave states’ abuses the Court’s cramped textual interpretation in the 1833 case Barron
v. Baltimore152 that the Bill of Rights applies only to Congress, not the states, and you have a
ready source of conflict between the prevailing judicial doctrine of the day and the founders’
original position that the Constitution protects natural individual liberties.153 “To a nineteenthcentury believer in natural rights,154 the Bill was not simply an enactment of We the People as the
150

Id. at 159. No issue “place[d] the libertarian track record of federal versus state governments in stronger
light than did slavery. And on this question, states did not shine. Slavery was almost exclusively a creature
of state law…. [A] major platform of the Free Soil and Republican Parties in the 1840s and 1850s was that
the Constitution frowned on federal involvement with slavery. Freedom was national, slavery local – hence
the popular slogan, ‘Freedom National,’ a slogan that would have sounded quite odd in the 1780s and
1790s.” Id. at 160 (citing, e.g., National Party Platforms, 1840-1968, at 5 (Kirk H. Porter and Donald
Bruce Johnson eds., 3rd 3d., 1966) (Liberty Platform of 1844, sec. 10, 11); citing also generally Eric Foner,
Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men 73-102 (1970); Harold M. Hyman and William M. Wiecek, Equal Justice
Under Law 17-18, 92-93, 170 (1982)).
151
Id. at 160 (citing e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth Amendment and
the Bill of Rights 36 (1986); William Goodell, The American Slave Code in Theory and Practice 372-84
(Negro Universities Press, 1968)(1853); H. Hyman and W. Wiecek, supra note __ at 15, 401-02; J.
TenBroek, supra note __ at 38-39, 125-26; W. Wiecek, supra note __ at 182-83, 280-81)). “Slavery bred
repression.” Id. (citing Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1st sess. 2595-2602 (1860)(remarks of Sen. Charles
Sumner); Michael Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton Helper’s Book, The Impending Crisis: Free
Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 68
Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 1113, 1127, 1132 (1993)). “Speech and writing critical of slavery, even if plainly
religious or political in inspiration, was incendiary and had to be suppressed in southern states, lest slaves
overhear and get ideas.” Id. (citing Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights 23, 30-38 (1986); Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution 211-12
(1956); Alfred Avins, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: The Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited, 6
Harv. J. on Legis. I, 17-26 (1968); citing generally Clement Eaton, The Freedom of Thought Struggle in
the Old South (1964); Russell B. Nye, Fettered Freedom (1963); Curtis, Curious History, supra note __;
Curtis, 1859 Crisis, supra note __). “In 1859 a Virginia postmaster even banned the New York Tribune, a
leading Republican newspaper, under a sweeping state censorship statute; twenty years earlier, the state had
tried to prosecute citizens for circulating an antislavery petition to Congress.” Id. at 160-61 (citing Curtis,
1859 Crisis, supra note __, at 1134-35.) Quite a fall indeed in a few short decades for the proud state of
Virginia, home of Washington, Jefferson, and Madison…. “Teaching slaves to read (even the Bible) was a
criminal offense punished severely in some states.” Id. at 161 (citing e.g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1013 (1866)(remarks of Rep. Tobias Plants); K. Stampp, supra note __, at 208, 22; J. tenBroek, supra
note __, at 124-25). “[I]n at least one state, writing, printing, publishing, or distributing abolitionist
literature was punishable by death.” Id. (citing Kurt. T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise
Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1106, 1134 and n.127
(1994)).
152
__ U.S. __ (1833)
153
In failing to honor the founders’ views regarding individual liberties as inviolable natural law, Barron’s
underlying message was that Bill of Rights provisions such as the first amendment were “merely an
interpretation of the positive-law code of the original Constitution, declaring that Congress lacked Article I,
section 8-enumerated power to regulate religion in the states or to suppress speech.” Amar, supra note 8,
~156, ~147.
154
Following Barron, it was left to lawyers practicing “the common-law method in mid-nineteenth-century
America … [to find that] even if the federal Bill of Rights did not, strictly speaking, bind the states of its
own legislative force, … [it was] at least declaratory of certain fundamental common-law rights….” Amar,
supra note 8, at 147 (describing “the common-law method of the mid-nineteenth century [as] involv[ing]
careful examination of codes, charters, statutes, and the like in an effort to distill their animating
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Sovereign Legislature bringing new legal rights into existence, but rather a declaratory judgment
by We the People as the Sovereign High Court that certain natural or fundamental rights already
existed.”155 Barron failed to reflect this view.
The philosophical debate concerning the constitutional interplay of state and federal government
with protection of natural individual liberties that took place in the first half of the nineteenth
century set the stage after the Civil War for the fourteenth amendment’s memorialization of the
notion that the Constitution incorporates the bill of rights to apply to the states156 and implicitly
protects natural rights. During the debate in the thirty-ninth Congress over the language for what
became the fourteenth amendment, Section 1’s principle draftsman John Bingham “made himself
abundantly clear. Over and over he described the privileges-or-immunities clause as
encompassing ‘the bill of rights’ – a phrase he used more than a dozen times in a key speech on
February 28.”157 Moreover, when asked again several years later after the ratification of the
principles…. Judges did not simply make up common law; they found it in authoritative legal sources like
Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus Act, the English Bill of Rights of 1689” and last,
but not least, the Bill of Rights).
155
Amar, supra note 8, at 148 (citing, e.g., Jacobus Ten Broek, Equal Under Law 90-91, 128 (Collier,
1965)(1951) (“early amendments [were] seen by contrarians as ‘declaratory constitutional safeguards of
natural rights’ and ‘a meeting ground of constitutional and natural rights’”); Howard Jay Graham, Our
“Declaratory’ Fourteenth Amendment, 7 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 3-4 (1954) (“noting centrality of eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century conception of various constitutional provisions as ‘declaratory’”); William E. Nelson,
The Fourteenth Amendment 59 (1988) (“quoting 1867 Pennsylvania legislator who described constitutional
amendments as submitted to the people ‘sitting as a jury’ – that is, a judicial body”); and, more generally, 1
William Blackstone, Commentaries 42, 53-55, 57-58, 86; Bailyn, supra note 6, at 69, n.13, 78, 187-98
(1967); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787, at 294 (1969); Suzanna
Sherry, The Founders Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Chi L. Rev. 1127, 1132-33 (1987); Suzanna Sherry,
Natural Law in the States, 61 U. Cin. L. Rev. 171 (1992).).
As one advocate of the day put it to the Supreme Court in oral argument in1840, “certain provisions of the
bill of rights were merely ‘limitations of power’ (procedural amendments), whereas others ‘are to be
understood as declarations of rights….’ Amar, supra note 8, at 153 (quoting Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S.
(14 Pet.) 555-57 (1940) (C.P. VanNess argument)). State courts, through these approaches, saw their way
clear to imposing principles distilled from the Bill of Rights within their own jurisdictions. Amar, supra
note 8, at 149, 150, 151 (citing, e.g., Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. 98 Gray) 329, 340 (1857) (stating, “[T]he
amendments of the Constitution of the United States, in the nature of a bill of rights, [should be regarded]
as the annunciation of great and fundamental principles, to be always held in regard, both morally and
legally, by those who make and those who administer the law [rather than as mere] precise and positive
directions and rules of action”); Gardner v. Trustees of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 165-68 (applying
“just compensation” requirement despite absence of state mandate “after canvassing the ‘soundest
authorities’ of Grotius, Puffendorf, and Blackstone, and the express language of [several neighboring
states’] constitutions, [the judge] proclaimed: ‘But what is of higher authority, and is absolutely decisive of
the sense of the people of this country, [the principle] is made a part of the Constitution of the United
States….’”; and numerous other state cases stating similarly).
Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court (ironically, given the antebellum era) was a leader in enunciating
natural law: “The Bill of Rights’ purpose ‘was to declare to the world the fixed and unalterable
determination of our people, that these invaluable rights … should never be disturbed by any government.’
The Bill was ‘our Magna Charta.’” Id. At 155 (quoting Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353, 367-68 (1852)).
156
The northern Republicans’ disapproval of the southern states’ practice of disarming of blacks in the
South, as discussed in the debates over the Act, “fed the determination of northern Republicans to provide
national enforcement of the Bill of Rights.” It is fair to say that “the efforts to disarm the freedmen were in
the background when the 39th Congress debated the Fourteenth amendment.” Cottrol and Diamond, __
346.
157
Amar, supra note 8, at 182 (citing Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088-94 (1866)). In this speech
“he also explained why a constitutional amendment was necessary, citing by name and quoting from the
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fourteenth amendment, in 1871, to clarify the amendment, “here, too, he immediately linked ‘the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States’ with the Bill of Rights: “[T]he
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as contradistinguished from citizens of
a State, are chiefly defined in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
Those eight amendments are as follows. [Bingham then proceeded to read the first eight
amendments word for word.] These eight articles I have shown never were limitations upon the
power of the States, until made so by the fourteenth amendment.”158
Supreme Court’s opinions in Barron and one of its progeny, Livingston v. Moore, [ __ U.S. __ (18__)].
The day before, a colleague of Bingham’s, Robert Hale, had suggested that states were already bound by
the Bill of Rights, [citing Id. at 1064,] but Bingham set Hale and others straight with the following
quotation from Livingston: ‘As to the amendments of the Constitution of the United States, they must be
put out of the case, since it is now settled that those amendments do not extend to the States….’ [citing Id.
at 1090, (quoting Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S., (7 Pet.) 469, 551-52 (1833))]. Six weeks later Bingham
again held forth on the need for his amendment, invoking ‘the bill of rights’ six times in a single speech and
again reminding his colleagues that it ‘has been solemnly ruled by the Supreme Court of the United States’
that ‘the bill of rights … does not limit the powers of States.’ [Id. citing Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
At 1291-93 (1866).] In a speech in January 1867, while the amendment was pending in the states,
Bingham again reminded his audience that his amendment would overrule Barron. [Id. citing Cong. Globe,
39th Cong., 2d Sess. 811 (1867)].
Bingham had earlier stated, in 1859, that “whenever the Constitution guaranties to its citizens a right, either
natural or conventional, such guarantee is in itself a limitation upon the States.” Amar, supra note 8, at 181
(citing Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 982 (1859)). Moreover, “no state could violate the Constitution’s
‘wise and beneficent guarantees of political rights to the citizens of the United States, as such, and of
natural rights to all persons, whether citizens or strangers.’” “p._fn.4. “Said Bingham: ‘[N]atural or
inherent rights, which belong to all men irrespective of all conventional regulations, are by this constitution
guarantied by the broad and comprehensive work ‘person,’ as contradistinguished from the limited term
citizen – as in the fifth articl of amendments… that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
but by due process of law, nor shall private property be taken without… Bingham’s inclusion of the
takings clause in this category explains a passing proposal that he made seven years later in the Joint
Reconstruction Committee, a proposal that Charles Fairman and Raoul Berger tried to use against Bingham
and incorporation. [cites]
158
Amar, supra note 8, at 183 (quoting Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1s Sess. 84 app. (1871)). Thaddeus
Stevens, political leader of the hous and head of the House delegation of the Committee on Reconstruction
that officially reported the fourteenth amendment, stated “shortly before the amendment came before the
House for final approval,” Id. at 185, “I can hardly believe that any person can be found who will not admit
that every one of these provisions [in section 1 of the fourteenth amendment] is just…. But the
Constitution limits only the action of Congress, and is not a limitation on the States. This amendment
supplies that defect….” Id. (quoting Id. at 2459). Two years earlier, in 1864, “Representative James
Wilson had made clear that he too understood the ‘privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States’ to include the guarantee of the amendments: ‘Freedom of religious opinion, freedom of speech and
press, and the right of assemblage for the purpose of petition belong to every American citizen …. With
these rights no State may interfere… Sir I might enumerate many other constitutional rights of the citizen
which slavery has disregarded and practically destroyed, but I have [said] enough to illustrate my
proposition: that slavery … denies to the citizens of each State the privileges and immunities of
citizens….’ Id. at 184-85 (citing Cong. Globe, 38th cong., 1st Sess. 1202-03 (1864); quoting Representative
Hale: ‘[T]hese amendments to the Constitution, numbered from one to ten, … constitute the bill of rights, a
bill of rights for the protection of the citizen, and defining and limiting the power of Federal and State
legislation… [There is much force in the reasoning that] there has been from first to last, a violation of the
provisions in this bill of rights by the very existence of slavery itself….’) Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1064-65 (1866)). In the Senate, head of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction Jacob Howard commented,
“The great object of the first section of this [fourteenth] amendment is … to restrain the power of the States
and compel them at all times to respect ehse great fundamental [bill of rights] guarantees.” Amar, supra Id.
at 186 (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866). Amar notes further that “the leading
scholarly work counts no fewer than thirty Republican statements in the Thirty-eighth and Thirty-ninth
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But the fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause encompassed more than just the
Bill of Rights – indeed, it was intended to provide constitutional cover for a full range of natural
individual liberties, which had been neglected and abused between the time of founding and the
Civil War (but this time mostly by state, rather than federal, government).159 This was in
Reconstruction-era Americans’ keeping, much like their Revolutionary-era ancestors, with the
core belief in the existence of “absolute rights inherent in the people, … of which no power can
legally deprive them, …principles which lie at the very foundation of civil liberty, and are most
intimately connected with the dearest rights of the people…. [These p]rinciples … deserve to be
diligently taught to our children, and to be written upon the posts of the houses, and upon the
gates.”160
With the constitutional complement now in place after Reconstruction, fast forward to the
America of the early twenty-first century161 – where oppressive amendments discriminating
Congresses voicing [similar] contrarian sentiments, and not one supporting Barron.” Id. at 186 (citing M.
Curtis, No State Shall Abridge, supra note __ at 112. The comments of all of the Congressmen cited
received broad media and public attention, yet “not a single person in either house spoke up to deny these
men’s interpretation of section I. Surely, if the words of section I meant something different, this was the
time to stand up and say so. Consider, finally, that all of these men offered glosses that mesh perfectly with
each other and, most importantly, with the plain meaning of the words of section I.” Amar, supra note 8, at
187. As Amar notes, “[I]In light of all of this, it is [indeed] astonishing that some scholars, most notably
Charles Fairman and Raoul Berger, have suggested that when Bingham invoked ‘the bill of rights,’ he
didn’t mean what he said.” Id. at 183 (citing Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 26, 33-3, 134, 136 (1949); Raoul Berger, Government by
Judiciary 141-42 (1977); Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment:
A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 Ohio St. L. J. 435, 463 (1981). “For a powerful rebuttal to the general claims of
Berger’s article, see Michael Kent Curtis, Further Adventures of the Nine-Lived Cat: A Response to Mr.
Berger on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 43 Ohio St. L. J. 89 (1982).” Id.
159
Amar argues that the Bill of Rights in its entirety serves to enumerate only a portion of those
fundamental freedoms that the fourteenth amendment framers intended to incorporate to apply to the states.
The reason the framers did not simply state clearly that the entire Bill of Rights was incorporated, he says,
was because they intended also to include other important freedoms found in the Constitution outside of the
Bill of Rights, such as the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus found in Article I, Section 9. Amar, Akhil
Reed, The Original Meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, 19 Harv. J. Law Pub. Pol’y 447 (1996).
160
Amar, supra note 8, at 153 (quoting Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 555-57 (1940) (C.P. VanNess
argument)).
161
Regarding the peoples’ trust in state as opposed to federal government, one commentator suggests,
“[t]rust in state governments enjoyed a resurgence during the late Nineteenth Century, particularly after
public opinion turned against the northern occupation of the South and the Union programs of
Reconstruction. [citing ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 582 (1988); FORREST MCDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE
UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 1776-1876, at 208-21 (2000); MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL
FINKELMAN, 1 A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 477 (2002)]. The Progressive reform movement of the early Twentieth Century, followed
quickly by the Great Depression, two world wars, and the Civil Rights Movement, set the nation on a path
in which national power was typically far more respected and trusted than state power. [citing Keith E.
Whittington, Dismantling the Modern State? The Changing Structural Foundations of Federalism, 25
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483, 500-03 (1998).] By the 1980s, however, resentment against national power
seemed to rise once again. [citing id. at 503-522]. Today, we may well live in an age in which the people
are as close to true indifference between national and state power as they have ever been, and are willing to
contemplate the exercise of power by either level of government, depending upon which level can more
persuasively demonstrate that it can do the better job. [citing, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Will the Court
Reassert National Authority?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at 4:14]. Gardner, supra note 40, at 1009-10.

41

against same-sex couples are passed in all thirteen states where the question is on the ballot;
where compassionate end-of-life choice is illegal in 49 states and where the one state where it is
legal is being sued by the U.S. government asking the Supreme Court to declare the state law
unlawful; where thousands are in prison for possessing or using soft drugs; where a woman’s
right to maintain control over her own reproductive decisions hangs by a thread; and where
religious freedom is under relentless attack. How did this happen? That the privileges and
immunities clause was strangled in its crib by the Court in the 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases
opinion,162 thus withholding from the judiciary a valuable tool for the protection of individual
liberties for the following 125 years, certainly did not help matters; but more generally Americans
themselves have not been vigilant enough in protecting their natural freedom of autonomy from a
“wholly new species of oppression…, [where] the democratic government, acting in response to
the will of the majority, … create[s] a society with a network of … [rules] that none can
escape.”163 Now is the time for change.

D.

The Freedom of Autonomy Amendment

Professor Elizabeth Price Foley writes, “Instead of a land of individual liberty and … tolerance,
America has become a land of public morality and intolerance, all without the benefit of
constitutional amendment…. [and w]hile there is nothing wrong with having an opinion based
upon one’s culture or religion, there is something wrong with imposing this opinion upon others
in a pluralistic society founded upon individual liberty.”164
That’s the problem in a nutshell. It would be one thing had American government undertaken to
micro-manage our lives and to infringe upon our natural rights of freedom of autonomy – rights
that our forebears identified in the Declaration of Independence and saw fit to guarantee to us in
the Constitution - pursuant to the grant of some sort of constitutional authority of its own, but of
course there is no such grant. Instead, government, as guided by a moralistic and often intolerant
majority, has proceeded to systematically strangle many of our basic constitutionally-guaranteed
private freedoms.
Many say this is acceptable. We are, after all, committed monists say,165 a nation founded on
democratic principles - the idea is that government obtains the consent of the governed166 through
an election process in which citizens elect fellow citizens, who presumably then represent the
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__ U.S. __ (1873) (holding that the fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause refers only
to the limited rights of “federal” citizenship, not to the more expansive rights of “state” citizenship).
163
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
164
FOLEY, ELIZABETH PRICE, LIBERTY FOR ALL: PRIVACY VERSUS MORALITY IN THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (forthcoming Yale Press 2006). (Foley manuscript, p.62, 67-68). Foley systematically
describes how conventional or traditional governmental approaches to various cultural institutions and
customs (for example, marriage, reproductive freedom, religion, etc.) deny specific fundamental liberties,
and in so doing proves her point that “Americans have long forgotten the foundational constitutional
principles of limited government and residual individual liberty.” (manuscript, p.26)
165
See supra note 27.
166
It is said that obtaining “consent of the governed” is a necessary, basic element for legitimate
government: “Coherent, stable – and morally supportable – government is possible only on the basis of
consent, and … the secret of consent is the sense of common venture fostered by institutions that reflect
and represent us and that we can call to account.” BICKEL, ALEXANDER, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
20 (Yale 1962, 2d ed. 1986)(discussing Judge Learned Hand’s favoring of democratic institutions and
principles over the countermajoritarianism inherent in America’s practice of broad judicial review).
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interests of all in the process of lawmaking.167 If it is the majority’s will in the course of its
legitimate policymaking on matters involving government taxing and spending, etc., also to
impose limits on the behavior and free will of individuals, then so be it. Those who disagree with
the policy decisions of the elected representatives have recourse every few years at the polling
station, so dissenters among the oppressed minority should stop whining and live within the limits
that have been imposed upon their freedom.
Of course to the rights foundationalist168 this vision is unacceptable in a nation founded on
principles of freedom and individual liberty. Government, whether guided by democraticallyelected majorities or not, lacks authority to deprive We the People of natural rights of freedom of
autonomy on matters of private concern – rights, after all, that had been recognized and
guaranteed in the nation’s founding documents - except under the most extreme circumstances.
Such rigorous protection of rights assuredly is not the status quo in America.
So, America is at a crossroads. Will Americans continue along their current path of complacency
and allow an ever-greater number of government prohibitions and restrictions on matters of
natural private concern? Or will they say “Enough!” and take necessary steps to put government
back in its proper place?
If Americans are committed to the latter course, nothing short of a constitutional amendment will
do.169 An amendment would make explicit the guarantee that the right of freedom of autonomy
on matters of natural private concern – a right contemplated in the Declaration of Independence
and guaranteed in the Constitution – shall not be abridged by either federal or state
government.170 The intent in enacting such an amendment would be to offer a scope of protection
for matters of private autonomy similar to that guaranteed in the analogous first amendment’s
protection of speech, where, in applying the Court’s current doctrine, absolute deprivations of
freedom of autonomy are upheld only in the most extreme of circumstances, and partial
deprivations only if in line with rigid guidelines. As to the latter, the doctrine would apply strict
scrutiny if the abridgement of the freedom of autonomy is content-based, and intermediate
167

Most assuredly, elections are imperfect proxies for the governed and their interests. As Professor
Bickel surmised, “It may be, as Professor Robert A. Dahl has written, that elections themselves, and the
political competition that renders them meaningful, ‘do not make for government by majorities in any very
significant way,’ for they do not establish a great many policy preferences. However, ‘they are a crucial
devices for controlling leaders.’” BICKEL, supra note 166 at 18-19 (quoting DAHL, ROBERT A., A PREFACE
TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 125, 132 (Univ. of Chicago 1956). Or, as stated by the eminent jurist Judge
Learned Hand, “Of course I know how illusory would be the belief that my vote determined anything; but
nevertheless when I go to the polls I have a satisfaction in the sense that we are all engaged in a common
venture.” Bickel, supra note 166 (quoting HAND, LEARNED, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74 (Harvard Press
1958)).
168
See supra note 27.
169
On the importance of memorialization of protections in a written constitution, we may profit by looking
back at the original motivations for a constitution at the time of the founding: “The American colonial
experience, climaxed by the controversy with England leading to the Revolution, honed American
sensitivity to the need for written constitutions that protected rights grounded in the ‘immutable laws of
nature’ as well as in the British constitution and colonial charters…. Americans had a novel concept of
constitution. The word signified to them a supreme law creating government, limiting it, unalterable by it,
and paramount to it…. ‘To secure these rights,’ Thomas Jefferson declared, ‘governments are instituted
among men.’ pp.8-9
170
The amendment might read, tracking closely the first amendment’s protection of speech, “Neither
Congress nor any State shall make or enforce any law abridging the freedom of individual autonomy on
matters of natural private concern.” The shift in presumption against would resolve close questions against
the government, much like the analogous first amendment.
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scrutiny if content-neutral, under which reasonable time, place and manner restrictions may be
upheld.
A constitutional amendment is necessary (a) to provide proper guidance to the all-too-fallible
government institutions entrusted with protecting individual liberties; and (b) in order to adhere
firmly to the principle of fidelity to a written Constitution, where any major change to our
understanding of the Constitution must be memorialized through the Article V amendment
process. On the first, I argue in these pages that the historical record demonstrates that the right
of individual freedom of autonomy, in all of its broad scope, is guaranteed squarely within the
terms “liberty” and “property” (in the case of the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment)171
and “privileges or immunities” (in the case of the fourteenth amendment)172 in the Constitution.
The fact is, though, that the judiciary, although it has found some fundamental “privacy” rights
within those terms, is inconsistent in its decisionmaking;173 moreover, it does not recognize the
full scope and breadth of the right of freedom of autonomy.174 An explicit amendment will give
the judiciary much-needed guidance in its indispensable judicial review function.175
171

See supra note 144-50 and accompanying text
See supra note 160-61 and accompanying text.
173
Judicial opinions themselves are all over the board on matters of individual freedom. It is not at all
unusual, for example, that the newspaper in the course of any few days will report on how a court in one
jurisdiction has upheld a particular privacy right, while another has struck it down. For example, on one
recent day the New York Times had the following headlines on the very same front page: regarding court
opinions on same-sex marriage: “Court Upholds Federal Restrictions on Gay Marriage” (describing an
opinion of the federal court of appeals); and “New York Gay Marriage Allowed.” (reporting an opinion of
the state of New York’s highest court). NY Times A1, Feb. 4, 2005. More recently on this issue, a
California court upheld gay marriage in California. (cite ~ March 15, 2004).
174
Some of the judiciary’s cautious response is understandable – courts, under separation of powers
principles, give deference to coequal branches of government and are properly hesitant to strike down their
actions except in clear cases. As Jed Rubenfeld writes, “constitutionalism as democracy is very broadly
opposed to judge-made ‘fundamental rights’ not derivable from any of the nation’s written constitutional
commitments. Little room for extra-textual constitutional law exists on the model of writing. But not no
room. There are, at the extreme limits of what a democratic government might try to do with or to its
citizens, certain unwritten laws of written constitutionalism, and a right of privacy is among them.’” Jed
Rubenfeld, Freedom and Time 223 (Yale 2001). See supra note 112 and accompanying text for
Rubenfeld’s discussion of anti-totalitarian right to privacy.
175
The doctrine of judicial review is regarded by some as nothing short of America’s greatest contribution
to constitutional theory. As Professor Bickel puts it, “Marbury v. Madison … exerts an enormous magnetic
pull. It is, after all, a great historic event, a famous victory; and it constitutes, even more than victories won
by arms, one of the foundation stones of the Republic. It is hallowed. It is revered. If it had a physical
presence, like the Alamo or Gettysburg, it would be a tourist attraction; and the truth is that it very nearly
does have and very nearly is. As any rate, most of us share, as Thayer said, in the moral approval of the
lines….” Bickel, supra note 144, at 74. Commentators are not unanimous in their praise, however:
“[N]othing … can alter the essential reality that judicial review is a deviant institution in the American
democracy.” BICKEL, supra note 166, 1986). Judge Learned Hand, for one, favored democratic
institutions and principles over the counter-majoritarianism inherent in America’s practice of broad judicial
review: “It would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to
choose them, which I assuredly do not. If they were in charge, I should miss the stimulus of living in a
society where I have, at least theoretically, some part in the direction of public affairs.” HAND, LEARNED,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74 (Harvard Press 1958). Thayer suggested, moreover, over 100 years ago, that
the very intrusiveness of judicial review cannot help but lead to a self-fulfilling weakening of the
legislature:
The legislatures are growing accustomed to this distrust and more and more readily inclined to
justify it, and to shed the considerations of constitutional restraints, … turning that subject over to
the courts.… The people, all this while, become careless as to whom they send to the legislature;
172
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On the second, even though the historical record does express the framers’ original intent to
include the right of freedom of autonomy within the terms “liberty” and “property” and
“privileges or immunities,” admittedly those terms are sufficiently ambiguous as to be subject to
misunderstanding or misinterpretation. And so they have been. The courts, by failing over time
to give those words their full intended effect, have effectually institutionalized (but still not
memorialized) their lesser meanings through operation of the common law and the doctrine of
stare decisis.176 The Slaughterhouse Cases’ effect on the privileges or immunities clause is the
classic case in point, where an erroneous interpretation of a constitutional provision by the Court
effectively put the provision out of play for (at least) the following 130-plus years.177
too often they cheerfully vote for men whom they would not trust with an important private affair,
and when these unfit persons are found to pass foolish and bad laws, and the courts step in and
disregard them, the people are glad that these few wiser gentlemen on the bench are so ready to
protect them against their more immediate representatives…. The tendency of a common and
easy resort to this great function, now lamentably too common, is to dwarf the political capacity of
the people, and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility.
BICKEL, supra note 166, at 21-22 (quoting THAYER, JOHN BRADLEY, JOHN MARSHALL 57, 84 (1901)).
176
The Supreme Court’s privacy cases “merely reemphasize the embarrassing sense of artifice, of post-hoc
rationalization, that has accompanied the right of privacy since the Supreme Court first discerned it in the
‘penumbras’ and ‘emanations’ of the Bill of Rights…. Every time such a right is posited by a judge (or
anyone else), there has to be some extra-textual account of its constitutional status – some extra-textual
account of why this particular right counts, even though unwritten, as a constitutional right. And such an
account has to answer to all the demands of legitimacy imposed by constitutionalism as democracy when
unelected judges render constitutional decisions for the nation.” Rubenfeld, supra note 61, at 222-23.
177
When this “most extraordinarily powerful court of law the world has ever known,” Bickel, supra note
166 at 1, does slip up – and it does from time to time – the effects can be devastating to the individual
rights of millions for many years or even decades. For example, Dred Scott v. Sandford, __ U.S. __ (1853)
(holding that slaves were considered as “property,” not “citizens,” under the Constitution) played a major
role in precipitating the Civil War; Plessy v. Ferguson, __ U.S. __ (1896) (holding that majority-driven
“separate but equal” laws in the states did not violate the equal protection rights of the black racial
minority) authorized Jim Crow discrimination of racial minorities for another sixty years; and Korematsu v.
United States, __ U.S. __ (1944) allowed the forced relocation of many thousands of innocent U.S. citizens
of Japanese-American descent into internment camps during World War II.
As an aside, it’s interesting that these three most infamous cases occurred at roughly half-century intervals
throughout the nation’s history, so if one believes in such patterns we’re overdue for another. History will
tell whether Bush v. Gore, __ U.S. __ (2000), (holding that a state Supreme Court’s determination that state
law mandated a recount of votes cast in a presidential election violated equal protection), thus cutting short
the election and handing the presidency to George W. Bush, will be similarly classified, but it probably will
not. Although the case, with its underlying political cast barely masking an implausible equal protection
chimera, deeply wounded the prestige of the U.S. Supreme Court and exposed the Court’s political
partisans, apparently in the end it did not change the ultimate outcome of the election (i.e., chances are
good George W. Bush would have prevailed even if the Florida Court’s recount had gone forward, see, e.g.,
__ “Recount ___,” The Miami Herald, ___, 2001). Since Bush v. Gore did not itself affirmatively change
the course of history, it does not fall in the same category as Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu.
Bush v. Gore exposes a potential Achilles heel in our constitutional system of checks and balances.
Specifically, the integrity of judicial review relies ultimately on the opinions of nine individuals who have
reached that exalted station in no small part because [largely as a result] of their superior ability to
negotiate the politics of judicial appointment. As long as the appointment process works well enough to
maintain a majority of competent Justices who are truly independent and not ideologically or politically
driven toward a particular viewpoint, we’re okay; but with the appointment of one or more additional
ideologically-driven hard-right conservative Justices to take the place of retiring Justices in the next several
years, this Court has the potential to hand down The Case We Hope Will Not Be Decided that may be
judged by history in class together with the earlier three in terms of violence done to individual liberties. Is
there any doubt that the addition of one or two more Justices like Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas
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So what’s to be done, besides arguing until we’re blue in the face about original meanings and
trying to convince a majority of judges on courts increasingly filled with judges appointed by
presidents the likes of George W. Bush on the merits of our viewpoints? Answer: We must
memorialize the fact that we are changing the terms of our consent to be governed by adjusting
the terms of the “contract” – i.e., the Constitution. If consent of the governed is a necessary
element of government legitimacy – and it is, under modern Enlightenment and social contract
theory178 - there is no other way to alter the terms of that consent than to memorialize the change
in the underlying Agreement.179 The difference in this case is that we’re in effect “rewould make a difference in how the Court decides matters of individual liberty affecting tens of millions of
citizens like abortion rights (Roe v. Wade and its progeny, including Casey v. Pennsylvania); gay rights and
sexual privacy rights (Lawrence v. Texas) or, for that matter religious freedom (The Ten Commandments
Cases? If those appointments are confirmed and that case is decided, it is also likely that at some date
years or decades in the future Americans are going to come around to understanding that government
simply has no place interfering in the lives of private individuals when those individuals are cause no harm
to another. When that day comes, The Case We Hope Will Not Be Decided would look as odd and offputting to those Americans as Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu look to us today.
178
See e.g., supra note 22.
179
See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 61, at 223 (writing that “[t]he only constitutional law binding on a
democracy that seeks to be the author of its own fundamental legal and political commitments is law that
derives from the nation’s own acts of memorialization…. [There can be very little] unenumerated
constitutional law in [a system of] constitutionalism as democracy…). This principle of memorialization
thus requires that we must be skeptical of arguments that the constitution may be altered by extraconstitutional factors, “moments,” or otherwise. See Professor Bruce Ackerman’s theory of a two-track
lawmaking system, for example, in which he posits:
The lower lawmaking track is intended to register the successful conclusions of pluralist
democratic politics – the mix of interest group pressure, regular electioneering, and practical
policymaking that characterizes the democratic polity most of the time. The higher lawmaking
track, in contrast, is designed with revolutionaries in mind. It … imposes a rigorous set of
institutional tests before allowing a revolutionary movement to transform fundamental political
principles….[: (1)] passage of time. Before a revolutionary change is adopted, it should have the
sustained support of a substantial majority, not just support at a single moment…[; (2) p]opular
debate must be given full play before a final decision is reached…. [This is] more than a
mechanical vote-count at a referendum. The higher lawmaking system is intended to determine
whether a revolutionary initiative has gained the considered support of a self-conscious and
deliberate majority.
Bruce Ackerman, The Future, supra note 18, at 14-15 (1992)(citing Bruce Ackerman, We the People:
Foundations (back cover dust-jacket) (Harvard: Belknap 1991).
This description is well and good, to the extent it is used as the cogent, incisive, elegant description it is of
how politics plays out under our constitutional scheme and results occasionally in a “revolutionary
movement to transform political principles” in a policymaking sense. But the moment the theory is
extended to support a suggestion that there is some sort of “complex process of ‘Publian politics’ where
‘we the people’ become authorized to change the Constitution without ever invoking the procedures laid
out in Article V,” as suggested by Sanford Levinson on the dust jacket to Ackerman’s book, we’ve gone
beyond what is acceptable under our constitutional scheme. See Sanford Levinson, Review in Bruce
Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (back cover dust-jacket) (Harvard: Belknap 1991). This theory is
just invented, and pulled out of thin air. It simply cannot be that anyone – We the People or otherwise –
can change the Constitution without invoking Article V if we are truly committed to a system where the
Constitution is elevated above all else as a governing document. To suggest otherwise opens up a
Pandora’s box of difficult questions about when, for example, we have reached sufficient passage of time
and debate to justify “changing” the Constitution. It cannot be – this dog will not hunt. In terms of
adherence to basic principles of constitutional fidelity, conceptually this approach is on a par with erstwhile
Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork statement that a particularly disfavored provision of the Constitution
may be conveniently ignored and considered as little more than “an ink-blot on the page.”
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memorializing” something that was already memorialized in the first place, but that’s okay – if
the government didn’t get it or understand it the first time, there’s nothing wrong with We the
People going back and making the point again with more pointed emphasis.180

CONCLUSION
America has fallen far short of the promise made in the Declaration of Independence and Bill of
Rights for protecting individual liberties of equality and free choice on matters of natural private
concern – rights considered to be natural and virtually inviolable from early pre-Revolutionary
years at least into the early decades of the nation. These principles, representing the very core of
the revolutionary-era and founding ideology, have been lost over the decades to an overbearing
government and majorities that are allowed to impose their beliefs and morality on others.
If the freedom of autonomy is to be revived from its slumber in modern-day America, Americans
must develop a greater understanding of the nature and rich history of this most basic natural
right. Greater awareness can lead to a shift in thinking away from the current status quo of
government as paternalistic overseer, and back toward the original intent of government
subservient to the individual. They may look again to the inspirational words of the Declaration,
knowing that from the beginning, our forebears knew it would not be easy. When freedom was
on the line, “the colonists knew … [w]hat would in fact happen [next] … would be the result …
of the degree of vigilance and the strength of purpose the people could exert. For they believed
… [t]he preservation of liberty would continue to be what it had been in the past, a bitter struggle
with adversity….”181 And so preservation of liberty continues to be what it has been in the past a bitter struggle with adversity - and only time will tell whether modern-day Americans have
what it takes to make the necessary changes to ensure its survival.

180

The freedom of autonomy amendment is necessary for all of the reasons we’ve discussed – but… one
must concede that it probably is a pipe dream. Mobilizing a citizenry to amend the Constitution is no small
feat – the Constitution has only been amended 18 times over the course of 215-plus years. And let’s not
fool ourselves. It would be especially difficult to spur Congress to action today, when it is so ideologically
polarized, to discuss seriously (much less propose) an amendment that would effectively curtail
government’s ability to regulate on matters involving individual choice and morality – precisely the matters
that many representatives’ constituents, after all, voted them into office to regulate in the first place. As for
mobilizing a majority of states to call for a constitutional convention, the other manner of proposing an
amendment under the Article V process, well…, even beyond the fact that no amendment has ever been
proposed in this manner, one must be skeptical if it could happen for the first time in this instance, given
the results of the 2004 election where state constitutional amendments limiting the individual freedom of
autonomy of a certain class of people were passed in all thirteen states where they were on the ballot.
181

Bailyn, supra note 3 at 85.
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